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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
For nonprofit organizations, securing and sustaining funding is essential to 
survival.  Many nonprofit managers see government funding as ideal because of its 
perceived security (Grønbjerg 1993; Froelich 1999).  However, there is relatively little 
evidence to support the claim that such funds actually make nonprofits more sustainable, 
and some research has even suggested that nonprofits receiving “fickle” government 
funds are more likely to fail (Hager et al. 2004).  The primary purpose of this paper is to 
examine the relationship between government funding and nonprofit failure.  Its 
secondary purpose is to understand the relationships between failure, government 
funding, and the causes for failure suggested by previous research -- instability of the 
funding source and low funding diversification.   
Introduction 
To examine these relationships, I first review related literature in Chapter 1.  
Based on this background, I outline my methodology in Chapter 2, explain my 
hypotheses and report my results in Chapter 3, and discuss the implications of my results 
in Chapter 4.  Here, I begin by reviewing the current literature related to government 
funding, nonprofit failure, financial vulnerability, stability, diversification, and 
relationships among these concepts.   
 
The Concept of Death in Nonprofit Organizations 
Literature Review 
Studying failure of nonprofit organizations is difficult, because nonprofits rarely 
declare bankruptcy (Greenlee and Tuckman 2007).  The federal bankruptcy codes 
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contribute to this phenomenon by stating that nonprofits cannot be forced into 
involuntary bankruptcy (11 U.S.C.A., sec. 303(a)).  Nonprofits can be dissolved 
voluntarily or by judicial order in most states, but they are more likely to merge with 
other nonprofits or simply disappear without any formal notification (Hager et al. 1996).  
Until the Pension Protection Act of 2006 revisions requiring some sort of reporting from 
all nonprofit organizations, disappearance from official records, such as IRS Form 990 
submissions, does not always signal closure, as an organization is not required to submit 
a report if it earns less than $25,000 in revenue for the year, and a disappearing 
organization may be surviving at a reduced level of operations.  Some organizations are 
thought to subsist at this reduced level for many years. The term “permanently failing 
organization,” introduced by Meyer and Zucker (1989), is applied to those organizations 
that persist in operations even though their ability to fulfill their mission is minimal.  
Finally, some organizations that dissolve do so because they are successful, and these 
organizations should be distinguished from unsuccessful organizations.  Interviews with 
leaders of Minneapolis nonprofits that closed found up to 20 percent of organizations 
studied fell within this category of “successful” closure (Hager et al. 1996).   
 
Survival Characteristics in Nonprofit Organizations 
Although calculating failure rates for the nonprofit sector as a whole is difficult 
because of the insufficiency of accurate measures of failure, several studies have been 
performed which aid in revealing the organizational characteristics associated with higher 
failure rates.  The earliest of these studies focused on simple characteristics such as age, 
size, and environmental or niche density.  Later, studies attempted to find more nuanced 
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variables and determine the reasons why certain variables were correlated with higher 
failure rates (Hager et al. 2004) 
Since Stinchcombe’s 1965 finding that younger organizations are more likely to 
fail than older organizations, age has consistently been accounted for in tests of survival 
(Hager et al. 2004).  Stinchcombe’s idea is known as the “liability of newness.”  A 
modification on this finding was proposed by Brüderl and Schü
Although organization size is often correlated with organization age, the liability 
of smallness was distinguished from age (the “liability of newness”) empirically by 
Freeman, Carroll, and Hannan (1983).  Researchers suggest that smaller organizations 
have more difficulty attracting resources and performing administrative requirements for 
some funding streams (Hager et al. 2004).  For example, staff skills might affect these 
organizations’ abilities to meet government requirements and measurement regulations 
for grants and contracts.   
ssler (1990), who found 
that the youngest organizations were actually less likely to fail than the “adolescent” 
organizations which have used up the good will and “honeymoon” period associated with 
new and optimistic endeavors.  This was finally turned on its head by Barron, West, and 
Hannan (1994), who found a “liability of senescence and obsolescence” among older 
organizations.  Taken together, these findings indicate that age is relevant to survival, but 
the relationship does not seem to be a simple one. 
Finally, there is substantial research to support the effects of niche density on 
organization survival.  A niche is usually defined as a demand for and supply of a 
particular type of good or service within the larger market.  Organizations in niches that 
are lacking or shrinking in capacity to support them are in danger (Cyert 1978).  The 
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relationship between niche density and failure is not linear.  Both organizations in a 
sparsely populated niche (Hannan and Carroll 1992) and organizations in an 
overpopulated niche have increased death rates.    
Hager, Galaskiewicz, Bielefeld, and Pins (1996), studying a set of 35 
organizations that had closed in a panel study, identified qualitative correlations with 
failure.  Although the researchers found that all organization closures were unique in 
some way, the authors were able to make some generalizations.  The most commonly 
cited internal factors for closure were personnel loss and turnover as well as financial 
difficulties.  Externally, respondents felt that market conditions (donors, client, and 
consumer demand) and organizational legitimacy were the biggest issues.  Finally, the 
authors found that nonprofits with size and age problems often cited disconnection from 
community networks as an issue. 
In 2003, Twombly studied NCCS data from 53 metropolitan areas to find the 
effects of shifts in environmental factors (including government funding policies) and the 
effects of organizational factors on nonprofit entry and exit.  In addition to confirming the 
liabilities of adolescence and smallness, and finding that emergency service providers 
were less likely to fail, Twombly found philanthropic culture within the community was 
related to organizational death.  Human service death rates in moralistic and 
traditionalistic cultures were higher than death in individualistic cultures, and Twombly 
attributes this to increased relative reliance on government funds in moralistic cultures 
and decreased private giving in traditionalistic cultures.  However, changes in 
government funding policies were not found to be significant in this study.     
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Financial Ratios and Indicators of Failure Risk 
In addition to studying relationships between organizational characteristics and 
failure, researchers have tried to quantify financial indicators of failure risk, or financial 
vulnerability.  Financial vulnerability is similar to organizational failure in that it is 
difficult to measure but important to understand for nonprofits hoping to avoid problems.  
The most obvious measure of health, financial surplus, is not necessarily a sign of success 
(Young 2007a).  No indicator can tell the full story of nonprofit financial health, so it is 
best to use multiple measures to represent this idea (Young 2007a).  Greenlee and 
Tuckman (2007) identify three areas that provide a context for measuring financial 
health: assets and liabilities, surpluses of revenues over expenses, and efficiency 
(measures of the productivity of funds within the nonprofit, including days of cash 
available, debt to equity ratios, etc.).  For an individual organization, Keating, Fisher, 
Gordon, and Greenlee (2005) add to these previous ratios to provide a set of fifteen 
predictor ratios that can be compared over time within the same organization to evaluate 
trends or that can be compared with the ratios of organizations in the same stage of life 
within the same subsector.  Table 1A, below, shows these variables and the observations 
of poor financial health that they were found to successfully predict. 
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Table 1A: Keating et al. Discrete Hazard Regression Results Showing “Risk” Prediction 
Ratios Correlated with Various Observations of Vulnerability 
     Observation of Vulnerability 
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Constant     X X X 
NA/TR net assets/total revenues Tuckman-
Chang 
- X X X  
RCI revenue concentration index 
defined as the sum of the 
squared revenue proportions  
Tuckman-
Chang 
+ X X X X 
NI/TR net income/total revenues Tuckman-
Chang 
- X X X X 
AE/TR administrative expenses/total 
revenues 
Tuckman-
Chang 
- X   X 
WC/TA working capital/total assets Altman -   X X 
NA/TA net assets/total assets Altman - X X  X 
EBIT/TA earnings before interest and 
taxes/total assets 
Ohlson - X   X 
TR/TA total revenue/total assets Ohlson - X  X  
Size ln(total assets/GDP price level 
index) 
Ohlson - X X  X 
CL/CA total liabilities/total assets Ohlson +     
NI/TA current liabilities/current 
assets 
Ohlson + X   X 
FFO/TL net income/total assets Ohlson -     
INTWO pre-tax income plus 
depreciation and 
amortization/total liabilities 
Ohlson - X X X X 
NAFail negative net income for the 
last year (dummy) 
Ohlson + X X X  
CHIN  (NIt-NIt-1)/(|NIt|+|NIt-1|) is the 
scaled change in net income 
Ohlson - X X X X 
COMREV
/TR 
commercial revenues/total 
revenues 
Keating et 
al 
- X  X X 
INV/TA investment portfolio/total 
assets 
Keating et 
al 
-  X X X 
 
Although a nonprofit may be interested in learning about its health over time, 
researchers are mainly interested in the ability of health measures to predict financial 
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vulnerability or failure.  Tuckman and Chang (1991), early writers on nonprofit 
vulnerability and health, defined vulnerability as the inability to withstand financial 
shock, and determined that organizations lacking in fund flexibility would be most at risk 
if a financial shock were to occur.  The authors decided a priori that nonprofits which 
ranked in the bottom quintile of nonprofits for at least one of their ratios (equity ratio, 
revenue concentration, administrative cost ratio, and operating margin) were at risk.  
Definitions of ill health (and inability to withstand financial shock) made from an 
observational, rather than predictive standpoint, include a decline in program expenses 
(as a proportion of total revenue) for three consecutive years (Greenlee and Trussel 2000) 
or a significant decline in net assets or “equity balances” during a three-year period 
(Trussel 2002; Trussel et al. 2002).  In each of these studies, at least two of Tuckman and 
Chang’s predictive ratios were confirmed as significantly related to the observed ill 
health.  Trussel (2002) included subsector information in the risk model, and Hager 
(2001) later found that the Tuckman and Chang ratios’ ability to predict risk varies by 
subsector.   
Most research regarding financial vulnerability has not examined differences in 
financial ratios for nonprofits receiving different types of funding.  However, a recent 
study focusing on Washington D.C. nonprofits and operating reserves found that over 70 
percent of nonprofits receiving more than two-thirds of their revenue from government 
grants had less than the recommended ratios of operating reserves.  This study also found 
that the organizations failing over the time period between 2000 and 2006 had lower 
median operating reserve ratios than the non-failing organizations (Blackwood and 
Pollack 2009). 
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Government Support for Nonprofits 
Government support for nonprofit organizations has both direct and indirect 
forms.  The most visible support mechanisms are direct subsidies or grants, and reported 
values for these sources of revenue are often used to summarize government funding for 
nonprofits (Rushton and Brooks 2007).  Organizations also receive support in the form of 
fees from contracts, which arise when government partners with nonprofits to carry out 
services.  Such contracts are thought to increase innovation in delivery of services by 
adding competition and financial incentives for those delivering superior services.  
However, some make the case that this source of income may reduce the quality of 
provision by nonprofits, lead to accountability and evaluation problems, and decrease the 
independence and uniqueness of the nonprofit sector (Lenkowsky 1996).   
The government also provides indirect support through consumer-side vouchers.  
These vouchers allow nonprofits to earn a set amount of revenue for each voucher-holder 
served.  The Medicare and Medicaid programs are examples of this sort of support.  
Consumer-side vouchers have been described as one of the greatest challenges for 
nonprofits, because they increase competition with for-profit service providers and may 
change the natures of the services nonprofits offer to conform to customers’ wishes rather 
than best practices for effective service provision (Grønbjerg and Salamon 2002).  
According to the Urban Institute’s The Nonprofit Almanac 2008, direct 
government subsidies (including grants and payments) to American nonprofits totaled 
$351.01 billion (Wing et al. 2008).  Between 1992 and 2005, the annual percentage 
change of public charity revenues (measured in constant dollars) from government grants 
and payments was 5.06, indicating an overall growth of government funding during this 
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period (Wing et al. 2008).  Within this total, government grants to reporting public 
charities totaled $102.78 billion in 2005 (Wing et al. 2008).  This comprised 9 percent of 
the revenue of reporting charities (Wing et al. 2008).  The percentages of total income 
differ by subsectors, up to a maximum of 22.7 percent for human service organizations 
(Wing et al. 2008).  Although reporting requirements make it difficult to calculate these 
totals with a high degree of accuracy, Urban Institute statistics indicate that the amount of 
government “payments” from 2005 was approximately $250 billion1, or 21.9% of 
reporting public charity revenues2
It is also worth noting here that the government provides indirect support for 
nonprofits including tax expenditures (which are taxes the government forgoes by 
exempting nonprofits from payment of various taxes by allowing tax-deductible 
contributions) and tax credits that may be tradable on the market (such as Low Income 
Housing Tax Credits).  These forms of support are important to the sustainability of many 
nonprofits.  However, as these foregone tax revenues are not tracked by individual 
nonprofits, and are therefore difficult to measure, they are beyond the scope of this paper.  
 (Wing et al. 2008). 
 
Other Sources of Revenue for Nonprofits 
Although government funding is a focus of this paper, it is also useful to provide 
some background on the other sources of revenue for nonprofit organizations.  Primary 
among these is donated income, which is the definitive form of revenue for the sector, the 
funding source which makes nonprofits unique in their methods of raising capital.  
                                                 
1 The statistic for grant and contract revenue is calculated by subtracting the estimated grant revenue from 
the estimated total government grant and payment revenue reported in The Nonprofit Almanac 2008 (Wing 
2008).  However, methodology differs for these two estimates make the calculation a rough estimate at 
best. 
2 Calculated as a percentage the Urban Institute estimation of $1,144 billion in total revenue. 
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Private contributions made up 12.3 percent of total nonprofits revenues in 2005 (Wing et 
al. 2008).  Donated income includes contributions from individuals, foundations, 
corporations, and federated institutions such as United Way organizations. Froehlich 
describes private contributions as being high in revenue volatility (1999).  This is because 
giving is affected by overall economic trends and varies with the S&P 500 (Center on 
Philanthropy 2009).  Other research demonstrates that, although the effect of tax-related 
changes on giving may be relatively inelastic, wealthy donors and the types of gift 
vehicles they typically employ, may be relatively more elastic, and thus more volatile 
(Center on Philanthropy 2009; Steinberg 1990).  Finally, nonprofits also experience 
variation in donated revenue with changes in the personal situations (income and wealth) 
of a few large donors (Center on Philanthropy 2009), who make up a substantial share of 
a typical nonprofit’s donated income. 
In addition to donated income, nonprofits also receive revenue from other sources 
which are similar to the revenue sources of commercial ventures.  These include fees for 
services (70.3 percent of revenues)3
                                                 
3 This includes the 21.9 percent of revenue from government fees.   
 and investment income (5.4 percent of revenues) 
(Wing et al. 2008).  Froehlich describes the revenue volatility from commercial activity 
as being “moderate” (1999).  Logically, the investment income varies with the market, 
depending on the type of investments chosen.  Fee for service income is subject to 
market-based pressures of supply and demand. 
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Legitimacy, or the Crowding-In or Crowding-Out Effects of Gaining and Losing 
Government Funding  
The resource streams which support nonprofits are complicated by the fact that 
they are not necessarily independent of one another.  Crowding-in occurs when funding 
from one source increases with increased funding from a second source.  Conversely, 
crowding-out is an inverse relationship between two funding streams.  For instance, 
under the often studied crowding-out hypothesis, the relationship between government 
funding and private funding, in isolation from other variables, is believed to be negative.  
Brooks (2000a) summarizes the current literature supporting both phenomenon and finds 
that the results are inconclusive, but that crowding-out is found slightly more often and is 
significant mostly in social/human service funding.  In this same time period, Brooks 
(2000b) hypothesized, and found results consistent with the idea, that the level of 
government funding determines the extent to which government funds leads to crowding-
in or crowding-out and the relationship takes a non-linear, concave form.4
Brooks (2000a), drawing heavily on earlier work by Rose-Ackerman (1981), lists 
several reasons why crowding-out might occur.  The public might see the nonprofit as 
less needy because of the influx of government money.  It may perceive that the nonprofit 
is like a government agency (which would not receive donor support).  The public might 
perceive a lack of strength in nonprofits receiving government funds, and may prefer to 
give to what they perceive as a stronger nonprofit.  Finally, the donors may respond to 
 
                                                 
4 In Brooks’ model (2000b), which states that the relationship between government and private funding is 
non-linear and concave, there is an amount of government funding that does not maximize total non-earned 
revenue.  Brooks (2000b) labels firms that operate in this funding situation without the risk-tolerance or 
willingness to reduce government funding to achieve the revenue maximization level as being in a “short-
term subsidy trap.”   
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their decreased ability to control the work of the organization or a perceived shift in 
organizational mission.  For crowding-in, Brooks (2000a) (drawing again on Rose-
Ackerman (1981)) relates the possibility that funds are offered as matching funds, are 
seen by donors as proof of quality or reliability, or spur the nonprofit to what donors 
perceive as greater levels of accountability and administrative due diligence (2000).  
Rose-Ackerman (1981) also hypothesizes that crowding-in may occur if the government 
funding allows the nonprofit to achieve efficiencies of scale or reduce uncertainty.  Most 
of these hypotheses relate to the idea of organizational legitimacy.  Organizational 
legitimacy or socio-political legitimacy, which is an area of study within neo-institutional 
theory, is the ability of an organization to maintain a positive image or reputation among 
its publics (Baum and Powell 1995).  Organizations are thought to do this by signaling 
conformity to norms and expectations through ties to well established organizations, 
people, and institutions (Galaskiewicz 1985; Baum and Oliver 1991)  
 
Resource Dependence: The Internal Effects of Government Funding on Nonprofit 
Organizations 
Resource dependence is the term used to describe the state of needing outside 
resources for survival.  This dependence causes organizations to work to maximize the 
amounts and stability of these funds and also work to minimize the effects of this 
dependence on the organization. Organizations must interact with and maintain 
relationships with those who control nonprofit resources at levels varying with the 
importance and concentration of resources (Katz and Kahn 1966) Many of the effects of 
resource dependence derive not solely from the restrictions or changes required by the 
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funder, but also from the nonprofit’s tendency to try to mitigate its dependence or ensure 
continued funding by responding to implicit criteria for continued resources (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978)  
Dangers from resource dependence on government funds can take several forms 
within a nonprofit.  One common theme in nonprofit literature is the issue of mission drift 
to conform with funding requirements (offered by Rose-Ackerman 1981, for instance). 
Froehlich (1999) relates several studies that found shifts in program emphases and goal 
drift but not core mission problems.  One specific example of drift is in the type of 
services offered.  Programs that are accountable to government standards of operation 
tend to stress equity of service, which may differ from program arrangements which 
would appeal to private donors or foundations with agendas that focus on one or more 
selected groups (Smith 1999).  Another expression of resource dependence can be in the 
staff or administrative decisions.  Grønbjerg (1993) and others found increases in 
professionalism and bureaucratization and administrative standards that more aligned 
with government among those receiving public funds.   
Nonprofits, like other organizations, develop core competencies in the areas that 
are most important to their survival.  This phenomenon, which is referred to as structural 
embeddedness, is also an expression of resource dependence (Froehlich 1999). 
Competencies in securing one type of funding, however, may not translate into the 
competencies needed to secure another type of support (Young 2007a).  For instance, a 
nonprofit looking to create or maintain a legislative earmark must develop skills in 
political advocacy to develop the necessary support.  It may hire executive directors or 
find board members with experience in this area rather than experience in other areas.  In 
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addition, the nonprofit may choose to pursue other forms of income diversification less if 
it perceives government funding will remain steady.  Hines (1999) finds that 
organizations receiving a significant amount of revenue from government grants are less 
likely to have unrelated business income than those not receiving such grants.  Finally, 
the organizational effects that are believed to account for the crowding out of private 
funds (as discussed above) may also be relevant here, as this structural shift is a result of 
resource dependence on government funds.   
 
Organizational Adaptation and Government Funding Stability 
The adaptive model of organizational survival expects that organizations which 
react most rationally to environmental changes will survive (Aldarich and Pfeffer 1976; 
Bielefeld 1994).  It is different from ecological perspectives because it places less 
emphasis on the changes in the environment and more on the reactions of the 
organization.  The adaptive model is sometimes criticized because it assumes that 
organizations can always sufficiently and quickly respond to environmental change 
(Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976; Hannan and Carroll 1992).  One adaptive role that 
organizations must take on is adaptation to unpredicted funding changes. 
Revenue predictability, and risk avoidance, is a goal for many nonprofit managers 
(Kingma 1993).  Although the actual stability of government funding is questionable, 
many in the nonprofit field believe revenue volatility is less of a concern with this type of 
funding, with Grønbjerg (1993) and Froehlich (1999), and Kingma (1993) describing the 
source as relatively secure or stable, at least for the organizations these authors examined.  
Grønbjerg’s (1993) research showed that more than 40 percent of the contracts submitted 
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from four social services nonprofits were preapproved or required no proposal for 
renewal, and no continuation funding requests were denied.  Two studies in New York 
showed similar results, referring to the phenomenon as “organizational entitlement” 
(Reiner 1989).  If this perception hinders the adaptive strategies nonprofit managers 
might otherwise employ, it could cause higher rates of failure when government cuts 
occur, according to adaptive theory. 
Other authors disagree with this characterization.  The study of organization 
hazard rates by Hager, Galaskiewicz, and Larson (2004) found that the probability of 
organizational death for organizations receiving public funding was 155 times that of 
those organizations not receiving public funding.  Furthermore, the young organizations 
that received public funding were found to have hazard rates that were roughly the same 
as organizations funded by other means, while the older organizations that received 
public funding were found to have hazard rates that were more similar to the young, 
government-funded organizations than to the older organizations funded by other means 
(the government funded organizations had higher hazard rates than the other older 
organizations).  The authors hypothesize that this is due to the "fickle" nature of public 
funds.  This assertion is also made by Rushton and Brooks (2007).    
Although a nonprofit that loses government funds may be able to find other 
sources of funding of equal amount to replace the lost revenue, these sources may carry 
restrictions that were different from the restrictions on the government funds.  More or 
less flexibility in spending, more or less effort that is exerted to secure the revenue, and 
more or fewer reporting requirements may not make the revenues totally “equal,” 
especially if the new funds are less flexible and more resources are needed to secure the 
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new funds than the old ones (Young 2007a).  Weisbrod asks if society’s “inadequate 
support for nonprofits [is] pushing them in undesirable, counterproductive directions in 
search of revenue?” (1998)  In other words, what organizational adaptations are made 
when government funding is lost, and what is the effect of these changes on the “quality” 
of the nonprofit?  
 
Funding Mix: Fund Diversity, Portfolio Theory, and the Relationship to Resource 
Dependence Theories 
 Given that nonprofit require funds from government, private donors, commercial 
income, or other sources to survive, nonprofit leaders must pursue some mix of these 
revenue streams to fulfill their missions and survive.  Nonprofits are generally assumed to 
pursue the funding mix that allows them to maximize some desirable objective (reward) 
such as mission accomplishment or revenue attainment, its proxy, and to minimize some 
undesirable aspects (risk) such as uncertainty or outside control over mission.  This idea 
is rooted in the business literature’s Modern Portfolio Theory, first articulated by 
Markowitz (1952).  The uncertainty of a portfolio is related to the variance of individual 
components of that portfolio, and the law of large numbers indicates that diversification 
keeps actual returns close to expected returns (Markowitz 1952).  Furthermore, 
diversification reduces an organization’s exposure to risk tied to one revenue stream, 
such as a change in political leadership, which corporate finance theory refers to as 
“unsystematic” risk.  An ideally diversified portfolio takes unsystematic risk, revenue 
stream variance, and revenue stream covariance (crowding-in and crowding-out effects) 
into account (Kingma 1993). 
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One variation on this theory states that nonprofits pursue diverse revenue streams 
that allow them to maximize their legitimacy in the community.  Legitimacy is thought to 
increase nonprofits’ ability to accomplish their mission-related goals and generate 
revenue (Bielefeld 1994).  This theory is in some ways a political-science-based variant 
on the objective-maximizing theory (Kearns 2007).  Like in the objective-maximizing 
theory, managers select an objective, but in this case it is a political, external objective 
rather than an internal objective.  They then work to maximize this objective through the 
proper revenue portfolio. 
 However, there is also some evidence that, given alignment of goals between 
nonprofit and funding entities and mutual strength to avoid interrupted funding or 
services, a non-diversified portfolio can generate stable and low-cost funding for a 
nonprofit.  Gronbjerg (1993) suggested that high-performing nonprofits can enter into a 
symbiotic and beneficial relationship with relatively non-diverse funding sources and 
achieve great revenue stability.  Recently, Foster and Fine (2007) confirmed that the 
majority of large nonprofits receive an average of 90 percent of their revenue from one 
type of funding source, and are only diversified within that source.  Furthermore, they are 
very efficient at securing that type of funding (Foster and Fine 2007). 
 Foster and Fine’s work also lends support to Chang and Tuckman’s (1994) 
“contingency theory” of income diversification.  Chang and Tuckman found that, 
although generally greater diversification leads to increased financial strength, certain 
nonprofit missions lend themselves to more or less diversified income streams (1994).  
Foster and Fine’s (2007) work supported this by demonstrating that certain funding 
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streams are more naturally-favorable to certain types of missions, and that alignment in 
this way was needed for succeeding with a non-diversified approach.  
 The objective-maximizing theory of funding mix selection is related to many 
previously discussed concepts through the idea of risk avoidance and benefit 
maximization.  There are many forms or risk that a nonprofit organization can wish to 
avoid.  Many nonprofit managers are motivated to reduce resource dependence as an 
undesirable, or risk-laden, state (Froelich 1999).  Managers are often motivated to 
decrease the administrative risks (the amount of time and administrative attention 
diverted from programs) related to fund acquisition (Froelich 1999).  Managers may also 
take the relative stability or instability of funding streams into account when making 
revenue mix decisions (Jegers 1997).  
Previous research has shown that greater levels of diversification leads to lower 
revenue volatility (Carroll and Stater 2008), and theorized that this could increase 
nonprofit survival (Kingma 1993; Carroll and Stater 2008).  Diversification has been 
empirically identified as a positive influence on certain types of organizations’ survival, 
specifically arts organizations (Hager 2001).  Diversification has also been linked to 
positive results in other financial measures, such as higher operating margins and net 
assets (Chang and Tuckman 1994)  and stability of program spending and net assets 
(Trussel 2002; Greenlee and Trussel 2000).  However, Kingma found that diversified 
revenue sources may decrease financial predictability (1993).  Authors have theorized 
that diversification could be detrimental to small or immature organizations because it 
adds a level of complexity which could be difficult or expensive to manage (Carroll and 
Stater 2008; Froelich 1999; Weisbrod 1998). 
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After reviewing the literature regarding organizational death, factors related to 
death, financial vulnerability, government funding, other nonprofit funding, stability, and 
diversification and the theories regarding resource dependency, structural embeddedness, 
crowding-out, legitimacy, and adaptation, the myriad of concepts surrounding the topic of 
this paper becomes clear.  With this background in mind, the complex task of 
determination of the relationship between government funding loss and changes in 
nonprofit organizations, such as financial vulnerability and death, can begin. 
The Role of this Paper in Relationship to Previous Work 
This work will synthesize previous research to begin to examine the connection 
between higher rates of failure for nonprofits receiving government funding with the 
causes suggested by the research – instability of the funding source and limited fund 
diversity, suggesting increased resource dependence/structural embeddedness.  It will test 
the null hypothesis that nonprofits receiving government funding are equally or more 
likely than other nonprofits to fail under similar funding conditions.  It will examine the 
effects of both steadiness and diversification on this hypothesis.  This work will 
strengthen the methodology used in previous research by examining a longitudinal, or 
panel, data set that has detail regarding many funding streams.  Detailed, time-series data 
is required to assess relationships involving diversification and stability (Kingma 1993).  
The single longitudinal study concentrates on a very small sample, and the size of this 
data set is an asset.  This work will also employ a statistical technique known as Cox 
regression which helps to untangle some of the issues of causality found in cross-
sectional research. 
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Academically, the untangling of the conditions in which government funding 
increases organizational failure, the use of a panel study, and the techniques which 
strengthen the argument of causality will address knowledge gaps surrounding 
government funding impacts.  The research questions will begin to examine stability and 
resource dependence/structural embeddedness as being correlated with failure of 
government-funded organizations.  Also, this research has practical implications for 
nonprofit managers as well as policymakers.  Nonprofits require funds to exist.  Securing 
those funds as well as the problems and requirements during that process are sources of 
concern for managers.  Nonprofit boards and managers must be conscious of the risks 
involved in all types of funding, including government funding, so that they may make 
wise choices and choose to mitigate these risks.  In addition, the knowledge that a loss of 
government funding streams affects the financial ability of nonprofits may influence 
government decisions to begin or end nonprofit funding.  It may also prompt research 
regarding the best ways to disentangle government funds from a nonprofit beneficiary. 
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CHAPTER 2: METHODS 
What is the relationship between government funding and nonprofit failure or 
survival?  How do revenue diversification and revenue stability affect this relationship?  
These are the central questions of the following chapters.  After describing the 
methodology and data set I will employ in this analysis, I test three research questions.  
First, because of the current disagreement in the literature, I analyze the relationship 
between government funding and nonprofit failure or survival.  For robustness, I compare 
various definitions of government funding, absolute and relative size indicators, lag 
times, and statistical techniques.  Next, because many authors attribute failure to the 
relative stability of a funding source, I analyze the stability of government funding 
compared to other sources and the relationship between this risk factor and survival or 
failure.  Then, because the resource dependence and structural embeddedness theories 
indicate that those nonprofits that are skilled at securing many sources of funding will be 
more likely to survive, I test the relationship between funding diversity and nonprofit 
survival or failure.  Finally, to combine these ideas, I analyze the effects of a diversified, 
stable funding base on survival or failure. 
Introduction 
 
An ideal experiment to study the effects of government funding on nonprofit survival 
would demonstrate, for government-funded nonprofits, the difference between their 
survival rate with government funding and their survival rate had they not been 
government-funded but had the same stability and diversity of funding.  The role of 
Methodology 
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research is to collect and analyze data which approximate this effect by creating an 
experimental model or observing real-world organizations.  Here, I employ an 
observational approach.     
 
Observation of Panel Data to Study Causality 
 Researchers observing real-world occurrences to understand causality must 
contend with underlying questions of causation versus correlation and with unobserved 
variables.  These issues are present with cross-sectional data, which is relatively common 
in social science research because it is easy for researchers to collect.  In cross-sectional 
analysis, one randomly selects members of a population (or sometimes a complete 
population) and collects information from them at only one point in time with the aim of 
analyzing relationships between variables of interest.  Because all variables are measured 
simultaneously, it is difficult to determine order of occurrences, and researchers are 
unlikely to know, for correlated variables A and B, if B caused A or if A caused B.  
Furthermore, researchers cannot determine if a fixed, unobserved characteristic of some 
of the cases causes the effect they are observing. 
In contrast, panel data, also known as cross-sectional longitudinal data or simply 
as longitudinal data, consist of repeated observations of the same objects of interest, such 
as individuals, cities, or nonprofit organizations.  These observations are typically 
recorded for a randomly selected cross-section of the population but may also be 
recorded for the entire population.  Panel data is used in social science, business, political 
science, medical, and other forms of research in which a variable of interest can be 
observed over time.  While panel data are sometimes criticized because between-year 
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calculations may exacerbate measurement error bias, two main benefits exist.  First, a 
panel data set allows one to control for fixed characteristics, such as characteristics 
intrinsic to an individual nonprofit organization. By assuming these characteristics are 
fixed, one mitigates some of the issues with unobserved (and even observed) 
heterogeneity.  Second, when variables change over time, panel data is ideally suited for 
addressing the time-order of occurrences to demonstrate causality.  It also helps when 
identifying lagged effects of variables which change over time, such as the effect of 
government funding which was lost in a previous year on the likelihood of survival in the 
current year.  
 
Survival Analysis 
Survival analysis is a statistical method used for studying the causal relationships 
between independent variables and survival time of a subject.  Survival analysis is a 
subset of duration analysis, otherwise known as event history analysis, the distinction 
being that the primary variable of interest, time, is time to death in survival analysis and a 
more general time until the subject leaves the initial state (such as leaving the state of 
unemployment for employment) in duration analysis.  Duration analysis is also 
distinguished from survival analysis by the possible inclusion of post-initial-state 
observations, which are not available in survival analysis.  Survival analysis is commonly 
used in medicine to study factors affecting death in a population or onsets of disease.   
The dependent variable in survival analysis is the hazard rate---the likelihood that 
the chosen event will occur in a particular organization at a given time.  Often in causal 
analysis, the researcher is interested in the effect of one or more covariates on the hazard 
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rate.  These covariates affect the hazard rate by modifying the hazard function.  This 
function is closely related to the survival function S(t) and the probability density 
function of the survival time, p(t).  These four concepts are used to describe different 
aspects of the survival data. S(t) is the probability that an individual’s survival time T is 
longer than the current time t.  That is, 
 
S(t) = P T > t( )= p(T)dT
t
∞∫  . 
This nonincreasing equation can also be expressed in terms of the probability of 
failure, F(t), and because the two states are mutually exclusive, 
 
F (t) = P T ≤ t( )=1− S(t) . 
Several assumptions are made in survival analysis. Most notably, (a) the data are 
assumed to be grouped so that durations fall into defined intervals, in our case years, and 
(b) any time-varying covariates are assumed to be constant within an interval 
(Wooldridge 2002).   
 
Methods of Survival Analysis 
The two most common methods of survival analysis are binary logistic regression 
and Cox regression5
                                                 
5 Linear regression is sometimes employed for panel data in which all individuals experience the terminal 
event.  Such a regression typically uses time to terminal event as the dependent variable.   
.  In binary logistic regression, the binary dependent variable 
represents the presence or absence of the terminal event, and the regression first 
transforms the dependent into a logit variable and then uses a maximum likelihood 
estimate to calculate the model coefficients.  These coefficients represent the change in 
the log odds of the dependent variable taking on the positive event. This regression is 
relatively simple to run and interpret.  However, three drawbacks are important.  First, the 
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procedure is unsuited to time-varying independent variables.  Second, binary logistic 
regression focuses on the total proportion of cases experiencing the event of interest over 
the entire time period of interest when arriving at its estimates.  This is equivalent to 
assuming that right-censored cases (those cases that experience the terminal event only 
after the end of the observation period or, perhaps, do not experience the terminal event 
at all) never experience the terminal event, rather than treating these as cases in which the 
event is potentially experienced after the period of observation is over.  In doing so, it 
assumes a constant hazard rate, which may or may not be true.  Finally, it fails to take 
into account time to the terminal event, or duration, in its analysis; duration is often 
considered to be an important characteristic in survival analysis.    
When some individuals are right-censored (i.e. the event occurs after formal 
observations have stopped), then the most common method for calculating the hazard rate 
for a data set is based on the Cox (1972) proportional hazards model (Lee and Wang 
2003).  Cox regression uses a partial likelihood estimate (sometimes called a maximum 
partial likelihood estimate), rather than the maximum likelihood estimate employed in 
logistic regression.  The partial likelihood estimate, which is the maximum likelihood 
estimate of the factors remaining in the analysis after the baseline hazard is factored out, 
is preferred because using partial likelihood allows it to avoid using censored cases 
(entities which survive past the end of the tracking) in calculation of the coefficients.  In 
Cox regression, only the uncensored cases (the non-surviving entities) determine the 
regression coefficients, although Cox regression estimates the baseline hazard using all 
cases (censored and uncensored).  Also unlike logistic regression, Cox regression utilizes 
the duration of survival in estimation.  Other methods utilizing duration of survival exist, 
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including nonparametric methods such as Kaplan-Meier survival analysis (which is 
unsuited to analysis of covariates) and parametric methods (which require one to make 
assumptions regarding the shape of the hazard function), but their purposes and 
assumptions are not well-suited here because we wish to analyze covariates and have no 
information about the underlying shape of the hazard function.  Finally, Cox regression 
allows for time-varying covariates, which is a benefit over other methods.  Therefore, I 
have chosen to use the Cox regression rather than a binary logistic regression and other 
duration-related methods in this analysis.  
 
The Cox Regression  
The Cox regression, or the Cox proportional hazards model, as it is often called, 
assumes that the hazard function, λ(t;x), takes the following form, which is generalized 
for proportional hazards:   
)()();( 0 xx gtht =λ  . 
In the equation, h0
To ensure a non-negative hazard, Cox regression assumes an exponential linear 
model for g(x).  That is, for a function with i covariates,  
(t) represents the underlying hazard model over time, or baseline 
hazard, and g(x) represents a function of observed covariates.  In the Cox regression, 
deviations from the baseline hazard are determined by the value of covariates in any 
given time period, and the size of these deviations is proportional to the underlying trend. 
ii xxxeg βββ ...2211)( +=x  . 
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If the proportional hazards assumption does not hold for a given data set, then the 
Cox regression can take on a stratified form.6  The non-proportional covariate is 
separated into strata7
The Cox regression can also be used with independent variables that vary with 
time.  Such variables can vary predictably or simply take on discrete values in each time 
period.  The Cox regression with time-dependent variables maintains proportionality, 
although each time period becomes a stratum like those described above.  When this 
method is selected, Cox regression assumes that the covariates are strictly exogenous 
(Woodbridge 2002).  For an instance with g time periods and i covariates, the hazard 
function, λ(t;x), is, 
; this process is most efficient when the non-proportional covariate 
can be expressed as a categorical variable that takes on a relatively small number of 
values.  A separate baseline hazard is calculated for each stratum, but the covariates 
remain constant across strata.  This procedure makes no assumptions about the 
relationships among the strata or the relationship between the strata and time; however, 
the researcher loses the ability to fully analyze the stratifying variable’s affect on 
survival.   
iietht gg
xxx1x βββλ ...0 221)();( +=  . 
In the model used here, the coefficients on the covariates do not vary with each time 
period; only the baseline hazard changes.   
Cox’s regression is more suitable for use with flow data than for use with grouped 
data, in which each duration is only known to fall within a certain time interval, such as a 
                                                 
6 As explained below, strata are employed when analyzing time-varying covariates. 
7 More than one non-proportional covariate can be analyzed in this manner.  For two covariates, each 
unique combination becomes a separate stratum.   
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within a year, rather than on a specific day (Woodbridge 2002).  These imprecise 
estimates of failure time can result in the appearance of ties within a data set.  When 
using the regression with grouped data, one must remember that the partial likelihoods 
estimate used in the Cox procedure assumes orderable, or non-tied, event times.  Some 
researchers have stated that, when greater than 5 percent of the observations are ties, the 
data can not be assumed to have insignificant bias (Prentice and Farewell 1986).  
However, this is a difficult standard to achieve with many data sets, including the one I 
employ.  Three common methods of dealing with tied event times are the Breslow 
method, the Efron method, and the exact method.  The exact method considers every 
possible ordering of failure times for a given set of ties and thus requires tremendous 
computing power for large data sets.  The Breslow and Efron methods each approximate 
the exact method, and the Efron method is superior when the data set is heavily tied 
(Farewell and Prentice 1980).  However, the Breslow method is the one available with 
the standard SPSS analysis package, and it is the one I employ here. 
 
 To answer a research question related to government funding, funding stability, 
and funding diversification, I required a data set with comprehensive financial 
information.  I was looking for a dataset that was larger and more representative than that 
used in previous research, and I also wanted to use one that had not yet been thoroughly 
examined by others studying similar research questions.  The logical choice for this 
analysis was historic IRS Form 990 submissions.   
Data 
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Sample 
IRS Form 990 submissions are a widely used source of financial information on 
nonprofits (Lampkin and Boris 2002) with gross revenues over $25,000.  The National 
Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) compiles data for use by researchers, and its 
databases are the most-used source of Form 990 files for researchers because of their ease 
of access and use (Grønbjerg 2002).  The NCCS-Guidestar National Nonprofit Research 
Database, also known as the “Digitized Data” is a cumulative listing of public charities 
filing Form 990 and Form 990-EZ from fiscal year 1998 to fiscal year 2003.  The 
Digitized Data database is the main source of information used here to examine the 
relationship between funding and failure.   
The Digitized Data database is unique among NCCS databases for its 
completeness8
 
.  This file includes all charities required to file with the IRS, not just a 
random sample of those organizations (NCCS 2006).  It is the only database to include 
certain variables, such as the amount of government grants (line 1c), amount of direct 
public support (line 1a), fees and contracts from government agencies (part VII, line 
93g), and Medicare/Medicaid payments (part VII, line 93f), and includes approximately 
350 variables per year, whereas the NCCS Core Files database contains only 140.   
Filtering Techniques 
Not every nonprofit organization is required to file the Form 990.  Nonprofits 
with gross receipts than $100,000 annually have the option of filing the Form 990EZ, 
although they may choose to file the regular Form 990.  Since December 31, 2007, 
                                                 
8 One irregularity should be noted.  According to the NCCS guide, in 1998, a number of organizations were 
“probably missed” when the IRS began scanning Form 990s (2006).   
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nonprofits with gross receipts under $25,000 file have been required to file the heavily-
abbreviated Form 990N.  Furthermore, religious nonprofits are typically not required to 
file with the IRS at all (although they may choose to do so).  Exceptions are made for 
some religiously-affiliated nonprofits, such as those that receive a majority of their 
revenue from serving the general public.  Based on surveys of Indiana communities and 
comparisons to reporting databases Grønbjerg (2002) reports the surprising estimate that 
organizations filing IRS Form 990 account for about 10 percent of the true nonprofits in 
the United States (this is a decrease from previous estimates).   
When composing the Digitized Database, NCCS works to avoid self-selection 
bias by filtering those nonprofits that are not required to file the Form 990 but choose to 
do so anyway.  Therefore, only small nonprofits which are required to file (usually 
because of receiving government funds) remain in the Digitized Database.  NCCS also 
filters those organizations with large errors in financial variables.  These errors are 
typically “errors over $1,000,000 and a difference of more than 25 percent from expected 
value i.e. value of components versus totals.”  The complete Digitized Database prepared 
by NCCS includes 338,864 organizations and their 990 submissions from 1998 to 2003. 
In addition to the organizations permanently filtered by NCCS, I removed 
organizations with other types of reporting errors from the data set.  I eliminated 956 
organizations (.6 percent of the data set) in which the amount recorded for government 
fees and contracts plus the amount recorded for Medicaid/Medicare was greater than or 
equal to the amount given for program service revenue, which was evidence of a mistake 
in reporting.  I also eliminated 13,116 nonprofits that failed to report a founding year 
because the age of these nonprofits could not be determined for analysis.   
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Small organizations also posed a problem because many are intermittent filers.  
For organizations that periodically do not report, researchers may misinterpret a year of 
non-reporting as failure.  To clearly distinguish organizations failing from intermittently 
filing organizations, only organizations with contiguous data (no missing years) from 
1998 until failure were used9
This filter mechanism also eliminates organizations that were “born” during the 
time period from 1999-2003.  Although there may be reason to reclaim these new 
organizations in future data sets, the filter mechanism chosen eliminates organizations 
where intermittent filing may be misinterpreted as failure, and these new organizations 
look identical to intermittent filing organizations in their pattern of reporting following a 
period of non-reporting.
.  This eliminated 181,790 organizations from the data set. 
10
One limitation of this filtering mechanism is that it cannot eliminate intermittent 
filers who chose to file only in year 1998.  To avoid including intermittent filers in 1998 
in the analysis, all organizations filing only in 1998 were eliminated.  This criterion 
excluded 9,833 organizations.  The weakness of this approach, of course, is that it 
removes organizations that truly failed in 1998 from the overall analysis. 
  New organizations have been shown in previous research to 
be dissimilar to other, older, organizations in many ways. Although these cases were 
likely to be interesting in their own right, it was beyond the scope of this work to include 
new organizations. 
Other organizations with potentially biasing status are noted for later analysis.  
Because of their special status (normally not required to file) organizations with gross 
                                                 
9 Any organization which filed in year T but not in year T-1 was eliminated from the data set.  This applies 
for T={1999-2003}.   
10 Of course, some organizations may truly have been born and failed during the time period of 1998-2003.  
These organizations would be useful to keep in the analysis if they can be distinguished from intermittent 
reporters. The ruling date may distinguish these organizations in future research. 
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receipts less than $25,000 are identified with a dummy (binary) variable and are excluded 
from most analyses.  Furthermore, because organizations with revenue less than $100,000 
can typically choose to file the Form 990EZ (which does not include a separate line item 
for contracts, for instance), their information may not have the same level of 
completeness11, and they are also noted with a dummy variable12
The remaining data set included 133,169 organizations, 94,377 of which are 
included in all analyses.  The number of organizations filtered at each stage is shown in 
Table 2A.  The number of organizations taking on each of the described dummy variables 
is also noted in Table 2A.   
 (although they are 
included in most analyses).  Another group with potential reporting problems or problems 
with accuracy is those organizations who reported a negative value for one of the 
measures of government funding; therefore, this group is identified with a dummy 
variable for later analysis.  Furthermore, organizations which take on a negative or 0 
value for percentage operations (because of revenue that is less than or equal to 0, even 
when an organization is operating), and identified and typically filtered when doing 
percentage-related calculations.  Finally, as suggested by NCCS, the largest organizations 
in each subsector are noted as potentially biasing outliers.     
                                                 
11 Among those filing the 990EZ, there may be a small number of nonprofits who receive small grants (less 
than the $100,000 990 filing threshold) that are coded as $0 due to way information is reported on the 
990EZ form.  If this were true, there would be a small number of organizations with a measurement error in 
the government funding variable.  This issue is discussed further in this paper’s limitations section.  
12 The dummy variable is based on my calculation of gross receipts using the raw data in the data set.  
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Table 2A: Data Set Composition 
Original Data Set 338,864 
Intermittent Filers/New Organizations 181,790 
1998-Only Organizations 9,833 
Errors in Addition of Relevant Variables 956 
No Age 13,116 
Included in Data Set 133,169 
<$25,000 Gross Receipts (Usually filtered) 541 
Large Outliers in Each Subsector (Usually filtered) 159 
Negative Government Funding (Usually filtered) 73 
Revenue <= $0 (Usually filtered in percentage operations) 4,076 
Eligible to file 990EZ (Occasionally filtered) 35,369 
Negative Private, Other Funding (Filtered in Hyp 3A – Method 
2,3,4) 2,854 
HHI-incompatible organizations (Filtered in Hyp 3B) 1,664 
Included in All Analyses 94,377 
 
Below, I describe the Form 990 entries used to create each of the variables used in this 
analysis.  I compare the methods used to that used in previous research.  Finally, I present 
some descriptive statistics on each of the included variables. 
Variables 
 
Exit 
The dependent variable of interest in the majority of hypothesis is failure/closure.   
As discussed in Chapter 1, studying failure in nonprofit organizations is complicated by 
the fact that nonprofits rarely engage in a formal closure process and, when they do, this 
process is not consistent across organizations.  Furthermore, a “failed” organization may 
simply be in hibernation and waiting for a funding stream to reemerge.  Or, the 
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organization may have gone out of existence, but may have fulfilled the original mission 
of the organization, which should not be defined as failure.  Therefore, when interpreting 
the results of the analyses, I call the phenomenon “exit” to more neutrally define what has 
occurred when an organization is no longer reporting.   
Of the 133,169 organizations in the analysis, 16.8 percent exited by 2003.  Table 
2B shows the last reporting year of the 22,310 organizations.  Each of these organizations 
exited sometime between their last reporting year and the next reporting year. 
Table 2B: Year of Exit for Non-Surviving Organizations 
Last Reporting Year Number of Organizations 
1999 5368 
2000 
 
4544 
2001 4450 
2002 7948 
 
Age  
In this analysis, I defined the age of the organization as its age in 1998 according 
to on the IRS ruling date recorded in the Digitized Data database.13
                                                 
13 The IRS ruling date is described by NCCS as “the year and month of IRS ruling or determination letter 
recognizing the organization’s exempt status.”  Nonprofit status is often granted retroactively to the date of 
the organization’s founding, but organizations are asked to report the ruling date rather than the founding 
date on the 990.  Therefore, nonprofits may be older than the age noted in this analysis, but their ruling-
based age would be expected to be ordinal-consistent with their founding-based age. 
  The following chart 
illustrates the distribution of ages in the population. 
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Figure 2A: Organizational Age Histogram 
 
Although age increases over time, it progresses at a constant rate for each 
organization.  Therefore, it was measured as a non-time-varying covariate.  This is 
consistent with the treatment of age in other research (Hager et al. 2004).  Previous 
research found that age is correlated with nonprofit failure (Stinchcombe 1965; Bruederl 
and Schuessler 1990; Barron et al. 1994).  Because previous research found  that the 
effect of age varies based on life stage of the organization (the so-called “liability of 
newness,” “honeymoon period,” and “liability of sentience” effects), I also conducted 
some analyses using four dummy variables based on age quartiles to avoid prejudging the 
functional form of the age variable.   
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Size 
Previous research also found organization size to be correlated with nonprofit 
failure (Freeman et al. 1983).  The size variable I use in the following hypotheses is from 
line 17 of the Form 990, “Total Expenses.”  This variable is time-dependent.  Other 
research has defined size as amount of income, expenditures, human resources, or some 
combination of these measures.  Past research has shown that the value of total expenses 
is highly correlated with other measures of size, including income (r=0.99) and number 
of full-time employees (r=0.99) (Hager 1999). 
To adjust for inflation, Hager converted the expenditures of the nonprofits in his 
sample to a base year using the producer price index.  I employ a similar technique to 
adjust for inflation using the consumer price index.  Here, 1998 prices are the base year 
for comparison.  In addition, to make interpretation of results simpler, I divided the size 
variable by 100,000.  Therefore, all results are in units of $100,000.  In addition to 
analyzing the time-dependent variable, I run some analyses with four dummy variables 
representing equal quartiles to avoid pre-judging the functional form. 
 
Subsector  
In this work, I used the 12-category National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities 
(NTEE) classification to represent subsector and created 12 dummy variables for 
analysis.  This designation is useful because it includes separate categories for hospitals 
and institutes of higher education.  The size and dollar value of reimbursements received 
by these two types of organizations may make them different than others receiving 
government funding.  Table 2C shows the distribution of organizations included in the 
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data set, by sector, in 1998.  Table 2C shows that the unknown/unclassified subsector has 
the least number of organizations, while the human services subsector has the most.14
Table 2C: Frequencies of NTEE Codes 
   
NTEE Classification Frequency 1998 
Percent 
1998 
Arts, Culture, and Humanities (AR) 13287 10.0% 
Education (ED) 18285 13.7% 
Environment and Animals (EN) 4514 3.4% 
Health (HE) 18273 13.7% 
Higher Education (BH) 1552 1.2% 
Hospitals (EH) 3557 2.7% 
Human Services (HU) 48340 36.3% 
International, Foreign Affairs (IN) 1220 0.9% 
Mutual/Membership Benefit (MU) 397 0.3% 
Public, Societal Benefit (PU) 16653 12.5% 
Religion Related (RE) 6785 5.1% 
Unknown, Unclassified (UN) 306 0.2% 
 
In previous research, the relationship between the charitable activities and exit has 
varied.  In Hager, Galaskiewicz, and Larson (2004), subsector was not found to be 
significant.  However, Twombly (2003) found that human service organizations with 
NTEE codes indicating “emergency” services were less likely to exit than “core” service 
providers.  Therefore, I include a sector variable in this analysis.  Although this work 
builds on the research conducted by Hager, Galaskiewicz, and Larson (2004), the sector 
classification system used by these researchers was not duplicated here because their 
scheme was created before NTEE classifications came into frequent use and cannot easily 
be recoded from the NTEE set used in the Digitized Data database. 
 
                                                 
14 Because the analysis controls for subsector, the relative weight of the different organizational types is not 
a factor.  It is, however, important that one have sufficient observations of exit within each variable to 
calculate hazard rates, as this data set does. 
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Government Funding 
In their work, Hager, Galaskiewicz, and Larson (2004) found government funding 
to be positively correlated with failure.  Although not specifically delineated in terms of 
990 categories, that research seems to define government funding as any type of 
government income except for income from entitlement programs like Medicare and 
Medicaid.   
To analyze government funding for this research, I used three definitions.  I 
present these from the least inclusive to the most inclusive definition.  1) Government 
grants, not including fees for services issued in a market-based manner, which I take from 
Form 990 line 1c.  2) Grants (1c) plus fees for service and contracts, which I take from 
the total of Form 990 lines 93g(b), 93g(d), and 93g(e).  3) All of the above plus Medicare 
and Medicaid payments, which I take from the total of lines 93f(b), 93f(d), and 93f(e).  I 
treat these three government funding variables similar to the size variable by converting 
each government funding variable to 1998 dollars using the consumer price index and 
dividing the variable by 100,000 so that the final result is in units of $100,000.  In 
addition to analyzing the time-dependent variable, I run some analyses with four dummy 
variables representing equal quartiles to avoid pre-judging the functional form.  Previous 
researchers have speculated that non-standard functional forms are more prevalent in 
event history analysis because the probability of the event of interest occurring is much 
more likely in a certain small range of a variable (Therneau and Grambsch 2000).  In my 
work, I regard the middle definition presented here (government grants plus contracts) as 
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my primary definition because it is most similar to previous work and represents a middle 
ground in terms of inclusiveness; the other definitions are presented as alternatives.15
 
 
Figure 2B: Box Plot of Values, Government Funding Variables (in $100000s) 
 
 
Steadiness 
Although previous researchers have noted that steadiness of funding may be 
related to the concepts of government funding and failure, those studying government 
funding in nonprofits did not use a steadiness variable.  Here, I use a methodology similar 
to that traditionally used to determine the variance and standard deviation of a measure 
within a population or a sample.  For each variable that included steadiness as an issue, I 
calculated the within-organization standard deviation by calculating the sum of squared 
                                                 
15 The box plot shown here includes all cases, even those where government funding is reported as 
negative.  As stated above, those cases are usually filtered from the analyses. 
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differences between the annual value and the mean value, dividing this value by the 
number of years the nonprofit was in operation, and taking the positive square root of the 
result.  It should be noted that, under this calculation, an organization consistently 
receiving no funding would have a 0 value for steadiness.  Because the standard deviation 
of the funding can reasonably be expected to increase with the average size of funding 
(graphing these two variables shows a positive, roughly linear relationship), I also 
calculated another steadiness variable by dividing the standard deviation of the variable 
by the mean, which is also known as the coefficient of variation.  Once again, an 
organization consistently receiving no funding would have a 0 coefficient of variation, 
the same value as organizations consistently receiving a positive amount of funding.  I 
establish the coefficient of variation variable as the primary variable and the standard 
deviation variable as the alternative variable. 
 
Private Funding 
Funding sources which diversify a nonprofit’s revenue, such as private funding 
(and other non-government funding, which I discuss next) are interesting in an analysis of 
government funding because of the literature surrounding crowding-in, crowding-out, 
resource dependence, portfolio theory, and structural embeddedness.  I use two versions 
of the private funding concept in this work.  The more limited is the sum of direct (line 
1a) and indirect donations (line 1b) on the Form 990.  The more complete also includes 
membership dues and assessments (line 3) and net income from special events (line 9c).  
The two definitions were necessary because membership dues and special event income 
often come from the same sources as individual philanthropy (individuals, corporations, 
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and foundations) but dues and special event income are different because the funds are 
sometimes given in exchange for goods or services.  I converted this data using the 
consumer price index and divided it by 100,000, which is consistent with my treatment of 
other absolute financial variables.   
Hager, Galaskiewicz, and Larson’s (2004) research includes dues and event 
income in the definition of private funding.  That work includes the percentage of 
revenue rather than the absolute amount of revenue in the model.  I test both in the course 
of this analysis.  In addition to analyzing the time-dependent variable, I run some 
analyses with four dummy variables representing equal quartiles to avoid pre-judging the 
functional form.16
 
  I regard the definition including special events and dues as my 
primary variable for consistency with previous research, but analyze the amount rather 
than percentage of funds for consistency with my treatment of other funding variables.   
Other Funding 
  The other funding variable is necessary to account for funding other than 
government income or philanthropy and will be used in hypotheses related to relative 
stability.  Other funding includes revenues such as rents, earned income from sales of 
goods or services, and interest and dividends related to investments.  Here, I focus on one 
particular interpretation of the other funding variable.  I calculate this variable, which I 
simply term “other income,” by subtracting the primary variables in each of the 
previously-defined categories, government grants and contracts and private funds 
including special events and dues, respectively.     
                                                 
16 When examining these dummy variables, I do not assign negative values to a quartile.  I assign zero-
funded organizations to a fifth category. 
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This is somewhat similar to the measure of “commercial income” used by Hager, 
Galaskiewicz, and Larson (2004), which included the percent of revenue from “program 
service revenue (e.g. individual fees-for-service, private third-party payments and 
reimbursement from government entitlement programs like Medicaid and Medicare) and 
net earnings on the sale of unrelated services” (Hager et al. 2004).  In that case, the 
measure was found to be insignificantly related to exit.  Here, I am interested in both the 
absolute amount and percentage of other income. I treat the absolute variable similar to 
other financial variables by converting it to 1998 dollars using the consumer price index 
and dividing it by 100,000.  When examining this variable, one should be aware that a 
certain number of negative values result from the inclusion of investment variables in this 
category, and the negative values are reflected in the results for percentages.  In addition 
to analyzing the time-dependent variable, I run some analyses with four dummy variables 
representing equal quartiles to avoid pre-judging the functional form.17
 
 
Diversification 
I use the sum of the squared shares of each type of revenue, known as the 
Hirshman/Herfindahl Index or HHI, to represent diversification.  The coefficient of the 
HHI diversification variable is interesting because resource dependence theory (and 
finance theory, in which the concept is prevalent) suggests that a diversified organization 
would be less likely to fail.  Furthermore, as I discuss in Chapter One, some literature 
suggests that high levels of government funding crowd out other funding sources, which 
would indicate lower diversification.  Including a measure of diversification may dampen 
                                                 
17 When examining these dummy variables, I do not assign negative values to a quartile.  I assign zero-
funded organizations to a fifth category. 
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the size of the government funding effect if it is actually operating as a proxy for 
diversification. 
I computed the HHI using all revenue sources provided by the Form 990 rather 
than the aggregate values I calculated to represent such concepts as private funding and 
other funding.  I included the Form 990 line items for direct public support (line 1a), 
indirect public support (line 1b), government grants (line 1c), membership dues and 
assessments (line 3), investment income (including income from interest on savings and 
temporary cash investments (line 4), dividends and cash securities (line 5), and other 
investments (line 7)), net rental income (6c), net sales of assets (line 8d) net income from 
special events (line 9c), net sales of inventory (line 10c), Medicare/Medicaid funding 
(each of the three variables from line 93f), government fees and contracts (each of the 
three variables from line 93g), and the catchall other revenue category (line 11). 
The data allows HHI to be modeled as a time-dependent covariate, which is ideal 
to test the idea that government funding may be a proxy for diversification.  However, 
research dependency theory would suggest that the annual values do not matter as much 
as the average diversification, so I test the average HHI as an alternative variable, and I 
also test the quartiles of this variable to avoid pre-judging the functional form.  HHI 
values range from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating that all revenue comes from one line item and 
smaller values indicating revenue from a variety of line items.  It is important to note that 
HHI allows for no negative values, so organizations reporting negative revenue in any 
category for a particular year do not have a HHI value for that year.18
                                                 
18 Although the pure formula does allow negatives (they become positive when the negative share is 
squared) the index loses its meaning when these negative values are included.  These negative revenues do 
not make up a real share of the organization’s revenues, and are not equivalent to a positive share of the 
revenues. 
  Furthermore, in 
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this analysis, only nonprofits which file the 990, and not the 990EZ, are included, 
because the data collected by the 990EZ is not rich enough to calculate an HHI.  In 
addition, nonprofits which erroneously reported earnings in HHI revenue subcomponents 
which surpassed their total revenue and, therefore, resulted in HHI values above 1, the 
logical threshold, are removed.  Therefore, I have calculated the average HHI with the 
denominator including only those years in which an organization has an HHI value, not 
all years that an organization reported data. 
 
Summary of Included Variables 
Table 2D shows the mean, median, and standard deviation for each included 
variable and alternative variable.  As a reminder, I also include, for some analyses, 
dummy variables representing presence of a funding stream or quartiles as alternative 
variables.  The data set includes dummy variables, in which 1 indicates presence of a 
funding stream and 0 indicates its absence, for each of the definitions of government 
funding.  It also includes dummy quartile variables, in which 1 indicates membership in 
the quartile and 0 indicates membership in another quartile, for age; size; government 
grants; government grants and contracts; government grants, contracts, and 
Medicare/Medicaid, private funding, and other funding.  
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Table 2D: Descriptive Values for Relevant Variables 
Variable Name 
# “0” 
Value 
Orgs. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Age 0 17.9 14.0 14.9 
Size TV (in $100,000s) 681 35.6 2.1 326.6 
     *Avg. Size (in $100,000s)  681 212.8 2.6 62862.5 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts TV (in $10000s) 91,600 12.0 1.8 78.8 
     *Avg. Gov’t Grants and Contracts (in $10000s) 77,674 10.3 1.1 78.5 
     *Pct. Gov’t Grants and Contract TV 91,642 45.3 40.9 51.6 
     *Pct. Avg. Government Grants and Contracts 77,707 34.8 23.5 86.1 
     *Gov’t Grants TV (in $100000s) 95,675 10.7 1.5 77.9 
     *Avg. Government Grants (in $100000s) 81,540 9.2 .91 77.9 
     *Pct. Gov’t Grants TV 95,716 42.4 35.2 52.9 
     *Avg. Pct. Government Grants 81,572 32.4 19.1 88.7 
     *Gov’t Grants, Contracts, Medic. TV 90,836 15.0 1.9 114.4 
     *Avg. Gov’t Grants, Contracts, Medic.    76,430 13.6 1.2 107.0 
     *Pct. Gov’t Grants, Contracts, Medic. TV   90,878 46.0 42.5 51.3 
     *Avg. Pct. Gov’t Grants, Contracts, Medic. 76,463 35.6 25.0 85.3 
Private Rev. w/ SpEv, Dues TV (in $100000s) 29,008 6.8 .89 67.8 
     *Avg. Private Rev. w/ SpEv, Dues (in $100000s) 18,564 6.8 .88 62.7 
     *Pct. Private Rev. w/ SpEv, Dues TV 29,133 47.5 41.6 126.5 
     *Avg. Pct. Private Rev. w/ SpEv, Dues 18,668 45.8 38.0 275.1 
     *Private Rev. TV (in $100000s) 44,097 7.2 .95 64.0 
     *Pct. Private Rev. TV 44,215 41.9 29.8 213.4 
Other Rev. (in $100000s) TV 6,224 32.1 .75 341.6 
     *Avg. Other Rev. (in $100000s) 2,996 33.3 .76 354.4 
     *Pct. Other Rev. TV 6,005 52.6 50.9 72.3 
     *Avg. Pct. Other Rev. 3,184 51.8 46.6 313.8 
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Diversification TV 17,866 .64 .62 .27 
     *Average Diversification 3,972 .63 .62 .24 
Steadiness Co. of Var. (Gov’t Grants, Contracts) 77,674 .79 .54 .70 
     *Steadiness (Gov’t Grants, Contracts) 77,669 3.3 .45 20.6 
     *Steadiness (Government Grants) 81,537 2.7 .40 18.5 
     *Steadiness Co. of Var. (Gov’t Grants) 81,540 .82 .58 .72 
     *Steadiness (Gov’t Grants, Contracts, Medic.) 76,396 5.7 .49 51.4 
     *Steadiness Co. of Var. (Gov’t Grants,       
       Contracts, Medic.) 
76,430 .79 .54 .70 
     *Steadiness (Private Rev. w/ SpEv, Dues) 18.102 2.8 .33 29.8 
     *Steadiness Co. of Var. (Private Rev. w/ SpEv, Dues) 18.564 .62 .43 1.3 
     *Steadiness (Private Rev.) 28,829 3.0 .39 29.1 
     *Steadiness Co. of Var. (Private Rev.) 28,834 .72 .54 .57 
     *Steadiness (Other Rev.) 466 6.8 .26 87.7 
     *Steadiness Co. of Var. (Other Rev.) 2,997 .70 .36 7.1 
     *Steadiness Co of Var. (Revenue) 264 .31 .21 1.6 
     *Steadiness Co of Var. (Size) 251 .24 .17 .24 
“0” column counts zero-value and omitted variable records (revenue<$0, HHI>1, and others). 
The descriptive statistics are calculated without the zero-value and omitted variable records.   
Time-variable covariates are labeled as “TV,” and table shows 1998 values.   
Alternate variables labeled with * symbol. 
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Correlations Between Included Variables  
To uncover the relationships between the included variables, I tested the basic (non-
alternative) variables using Pearson’s correlation.  I entered the initial variables into this 
analysis;  I entered variables that are time-varying are entered as only their 1998 values 
because of the issues with relationships between subsequent years’ values for these items 
and problems with missing variables in later years.  Most variables displayed very low 
correlations.  However, we find that the Size and Other Revenue variables have a high 
correlation, at greater than 0.9 on a 0 to 1 scale.   
No variables were removed from the analyses based on this correlation, although 
these results will help to inform the creation of subsequent models and the interpretation 
of the results.  Specifically, results including the Size and Other Revenue variables must 
be interpreted with this correlation in mind, and calculations including both variables 
should be examined closely because one would expect that both variables would not be 
significant in many instances.  The results are shown in Table 2E. 
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Table 2E: Correlations Between Primary Variables 
 Age Size TV (in 
$100000s) 
Gov’t Grants 
and Contracts 
TV (in 
$10000s) 
Private Rev. 
w/ SpEv, 
Dues TV (in 
$100000s) 
Other Rev. 
TV (in        
$100000s) 
Steadiness 
Co. of Var. 
(Gov’t 
Grants, 
Contracts) 
Diversificat-
ion TV 
Age 
1       
Size TV (in $100000s) 
.009 *** 1      
Gov’t Grants, Contracts 
TV (in $100000s) .006 * .370 *** 1     
Private Rev. w/ SpEv, 
Dues TV (in $100000s) .005 # .338 *** .313 *** 1    
Other Rev. TV (in 
$100000s) .008 ** .956 *** .266 *** .247*** 1   
Steadiness Co. of Var. 
(Gov’t Grants, Contracts) .008 ** .024 *** .001 .009 ** .022 *** 1  
Diversification TV19
0.000 
 
0.007* .019*** -0.022*** 0.004 -0.055 *** 1 
*** Significant at the .001 level (2-tailed) 
** Significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) 
* Significant at the .05 level (2-tailed) 
# Significant at the .1 level (2-tailed) 
 
 
                                                 
19 The correlation was calculated using only those organizations that are included in the HHI-related calculations (excludes organizations with HHI<=0 or >1, as 
well as other normally excluded organizations. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESULTS 
In this chapter, I test three research questions.  I chose these questions based on 
rationales that researchers and practitioners use to explain the relationship between 
government funding and failure.  First, I test the basic relationship between government 
funding and nonprofit exit, the term I prefer to failure.  I use the alternative variables to 
compare various definitions of government funding, absolute and relative funding 
amount indicators, and the effects of lagged and concurrent variable techniques.  I also 
analyze the results of alternative statistical techniques and data set composition.  Next, 
because the literature hypothesizes that relationships between funding sources and exit 
are caused by relative stability of those funding sources, I analyze the stability of 
government funding compared to other sources and the relationship between stability and 
nonprofit exit.  Then, because the literature suggests nonprofits that are skilled at 
securing many sources of funding will be more likely to survive and because the presence 
of government funding may be understood as a proxy for diversified funding, I test the 
relationship between funding diversity and nonprofit exit.  Finally, to combine these 
ideas, I analyze the variables I found significant in earlier tests to understand the effect of 
a diversified, stable funding base on nonprofit exit. 
Introduction 
 
The first hypothesis seeks to directly address the core question regarding the 
relationship between government funding and nonprofit exit.  As I explain in Chapter 1, 
the literature is unclear about the relationship between government funding and nonprofit 
Hypothesis 1 
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exit.  Hager, Galaskiewicz, and Larson, whose analysis most closely resembles mine, 
found that nonprofits receiving government funding were 155 times more likely to fail 
than nonprofits in the population as a whole.  Therefore, the one-sided alternative 
hypothesis tested is that the received wisdom is correct and government-funded 
nonprofits are more likely to fail. 
 
Hypothesis H0
I tested this hypothesis using a wide variety of representations of the government 
funding variable and other tests for robustness.  In each, I examined the Digitized Data 
and applied a Cox regression with controls for sectors, age, and size (time-variable).  
First, I applied my primary, time-dependent, lagged government funding variable. Next, I 
used a dummy variable as Hager, Galaskiewicz, and Larson used in their research.  
Following this, I employed quartiles representing different funding levels to examine the 
functional form.  Next, I used an alternative variable representing percent of funding 
rather than absolute value.  Finally, I tested a number of alternative variables including 
other definitions of funding and non-lagged variables, looked at variations in the results 
when different sets of questionable cases were excluded from the analysis, and tested the 
alternative binomial logistic regression. 
1: Nonprofits receiving government funding are not more likely to 
exit than those nonprofits without government funding. 
 
Method 1 
 The first method I employ uses a time-dependent, lagged variable for government 
funding.  Here, I define government funding as all grants and contracts, outside of 
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Medicare/Medicaid funding (which is reported separately).  Because of the robust data 
set at my disposal, I am able to perform more data-rich analysis than is possible using a 
dummy variable approach employed by Hager, Galaskiewicz, and Larson (2004).  The 
results, using the data set without the “usually filtered” variables described in Chapter 2, 
are displayed in Table 3A.   
Table 3A: Cox Regression Estimate of Hazard of Organizational Closure with Time-
Dependent Government Funding 
Independent Variables β  (SE) Hazard Ratio 
Arts, Culture, and Humanities (AR) -1.047 (.093) *** -64.9 
Education (ED) -0.953 (.092) *** -61.4 
Environment and Animals (EN) -1.112 (.098) *** -67.1 
Health (HE) -0.991 (.092) *** -62.9 
Higher Education (BH) -1.233 (.120) *** -70.8 
Hospitals (EH) -0.780 (.102) *** -54.2 
Human Services (HU) -1.041 (.091) *** -64.7 
International, Foreign Affairs (IN) -0.797 (.111) *** -55.0 
Mutual/Membership Benefit (MU) -0.570 (.135) *** -43.4 
Public, Societal Benefit (PU) -0.855 (.092) *** -57.5 
Religion Related (RE) -0.585 (.093) *** -44.3 
Age -0.002 (.000) *** -0.2 
Size TV (in $100000s) -0.001 (.000) *** -0.1 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts TV (in $100000s) -0.021 (.001) *** -2.1 
-2 Log likelihood 522377.8 
- 2 LL model chi-square 826.212 *** 
Number of events (exits) 22162 of 132396 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05  # p < .1 
Note : Standard errors in parentheses. 
The NTEE category for “Unknown” is excluded, so dummy variable for NTEE subsector is in 
comparison to the Unknown category. 
 
Table 3A includes the coefficient for each included variable, including a beta of   
-0.021 for the government funding variable.  The coefficient can be understood as a 
hazard rate, or the probability of exit in a given period, given survival in all previous 
periods.  It can also be understood in terms of a hazard ratio, which is the ratio of the 
hazard rate in one group compared to the hazard rate in a second group.  (In the case of a 
continuous covariate, the ratio compares the hazard rate of a marginal increase of one 
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unit to the hazard rate without the increase.)  Therefore, the hazard ratio can be expressed 
as a percentage increase (or decrease) of the hazard rate based on presence in the dummy 
group or a marginal increase in the continuous variable.  Here, every additional $100,000 
of government funding is associated with a 2.1 percent decrease in the hazard of exit.20  
This is not the expected sign, given the work of Hager, Galaskiewicz, and Larson (2004), 
and, using Model 1, I fail to reject the null hypothesis.21
 
 
Method 2 
The work by Hager, Galaskiewicz, and Larson (2004) uses a simple dummy 
(binary) variable to indicate the presence or absence of government funding.  Here, for a 
more direct comparison than Model 1, I also use a dummy variable for government 
funding.  Using the grants and contracts definition of government funding, the presence 
of funding was correlated with a -0.614 beta and a 45.9 percent decrease in the hazard of 
exit.  The results are presented in Table 3B.22
                                                 
20 I performed a follow-up analysis which showed, for a data set of only government-funded organizations, 
a $100,000 increase in either lagged, time-varying government funding was correlated with a 1 percent 
decrease in the hazard of exit (significant at .001 level), although the effect of an increase in size was 
changed for this data set, with a $100,000 increase correlated with a 0.03 percent increase in the hazard of 
exit.   
 
21 I obtain similar results using a non-filtered data set, a data set without revenues less than or equal to 0, 
and a more extensively filtered data set.  Using the non-filtered data set, there is a beta of -0.016, indicating 
a decrease in the hazard of closure of 1.5 percent for those organizations receiving an additional $100,000 
of government funding.  Using the extensively filtered data set, a beta of -0.011 indicates a decrease in the 
hazard of exit of 1.1 percent for each additional $100,000 of government funding. 
22 I obtain similar results using a non-filtered data set, which shows that the presence of funding was 
correlated with a -0.619 beta and a 46.2 percent decrease in the hazard of exit.  With an extensively filtered 
data set, the presence of funding was correlated with a -0.432 beta and a 35.0 percent decrease in the hazard 
of exit.   
  53    
Table 3B: Cox Regression Estimate of Hazard of Organizational Closure with Dummy-
Variable Government Funding 
Independent Variables β  (SE) Hazard Ratio 
Arts, Culture, and Humanities (AR) -0.911 (.093)*** -59.8 
Education (ED) -0.967 (.092)*** -62.0 
Environment and Animals (EN) -1.005 (.098)*** -63.4 
Health (HE) -0.935 (0.92)*** -60.7 
Higher Education (BH) -1.166 (.120)*** -68.9 
Hospitals (EH) -0.729 (.102)*** -51.8 
Human Services (HU) -0.933 (.091)*** -60.7 
International, Foreign Affairs (IN) -0.821 (.111)*** -56.0 
Mutual/Membership Benefit (MU) -0.642 (.135)*** -47.4 
Public, Societal Benefit (PU) -0.841 (.092)*** -56.9 
Religion Related (RE) -0.666 (.093)*** -48.6 
Age -0.002 (.000)*** -0.2 
Size TV (in $100000s) -0.001 (.000)*** -0.1 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts?  -0.614 (.015)*** -45.9 
-2 Log likelihood 517256.691 
- 2 LL model chi-square 2362.601 *** 
Number of events (exits) 22162 of 132396 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05  # p < .1 
Note : Standard errors in parentheses. 
The NTEE category for “Unknown” is excluded, so dummy variable for NTEE subsector is in 
comparison to the Unknown category. 
 
In contrast to the data set used by Hager, Galaskiewicz, and Larson (2004), the 
data set here finds a negative relationship between government funding and exit.  Once 
again, the results of Method 2 fail to reject the null hypothesis.  One possible explanation 
is that the smaller size of the organizations examined by previous researchers is not 
represented well by the functional form in Method 1 or 2, therefore I employ Method 3 
and 4 to examine the functional form. 
 
Method 3 
To investigate the functional form of the hazard rate and the hazard rate for 
smaller organizations more closely, I divided the cases into five categories based on 
average amount of government funding during the time an organization was in existence 
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from 1998-2003.  Here, I grouped zero-funded organizations together23
Table 3C: Cox Regression Estimate of Hazard of Organizational Closure with 
Government Funding Quartiles 
, and I divided 
government-funded organizations into four quartiles (labeled in order of increasing 
funding).  The results are presented in Table 3C.   
Independent Variables β  (SE) Hazard Ratio 
Arts, Culture, and Humanities (AR) -0.925 (.093)*** -60.3 
Education (ED) -0.956 (.092)*** -61.6 
Environment and Animals (EN) -1.011 (.098)*** -63.6 
Health (HE) -0.912 (.092)*** -59.8 
Higher Education (BH) -1.130 (.120)*** -67.7 
Hospitals (EH) -0.752 (.012)*** -52.9 
Human Services (HU) -0.918 (.091)*** -60.1 
International, Foreign Affairs (IN) -0.807 (.111)*** -55.4 
Mutual/Membership Benefit (MU) -0.636 (.135)*** -47.1 
Public, Societal Benefit (PU) -0.831 (.092)*** -56.4 
Religion Related (RE) -0.657 (.093)*** -48.2 
Age -0.002 (.000)*** -0.2 
Size TV (in $100000s) -0.001 (.000)*** -0.1 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts Q1 -0.537 (.026)*** -41.6 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts Q2 -0.465 (.025)*** -37.2 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts Q3 -0.616 (.027)*** -46.0 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts Q4 -0.922 (.032)*** -60.2 
-2 Log likelihood 517098.774 
- 2 LL model chi-square 2486.886 *** 
Number of events (exits) 22162 of 132396 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05  # p < .1 
Note : Standard errors in parentheses. 
The NTEE category for “Unknown” is excluded, so dummy variables for NTEE subsector are 
analyzed in comparison to the Unknown category. 
The category for zero-funded organizations is excluded, so dummy variables for the quartiles of 
government funding are analyzed in comparison to zero-funded organizations. 
 
As shown here, government-funded organizations in each of the four funding 
amount quartiles are less likely to exit than zero-funded organizations.  From smallest to 
                                                 
23 In the unfiltered data set, which includes some organizations with negative government funding which 
are subsequently grouped with the zero-funded organizations because they have less than $0 in government 
funding, the betas for each quartile, from smallest to largest, were -0.539, -0.465, -0.618, and -0.935, 
indicating that membership in the data set decreased the hazard of closure by 41.7, 37.2, 46.1, and 60.7 
percent when compared to zero-funded organizations.  In the extensively filtered data set, the betas for each 
quartile, from smallest to largest, were -0.419, -0.340, -0.345, and -0.631 indicating that membership in the 
data set decreased the hazard of closure by 34.2, 28.8, 29.2, and 46.8 percent when compared to zero-
funded organizations. 
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largest, the quartiles have 41.6, 37.2, 46.0, and 60.2 percent decreases in the hazard of 
exit, when compared to zero-funded organizations.24
 
  This shows that the organizations 
with the least funding are actually less likely to exit than those in the second quartile of 
government funding, which would not support a log-linear functional form, which is the 
standard assumption.  Method 3 also fails to reject the null hypothesis and differs from 
the previously published work by Hager, Galaskiewicz, and Larson (2004).  However, the 
data set used in the previously published work focused on organizations that were small 
in size, not only small in funding amount, and I therefore examine relative funding size in 
Method 4. 
Method 4 
The previous analyses deal with the amount of government funding.  However, a 
government grant of $100,000 has a different effect on an organization with a budget of 
$750,000 than is has on an organization with a budget of $7,500,000.  Therefore, I next 
run a Cox regression considering the amount of government funding as a percentage of 
total funding rather than an absolute value.  The percentage variable is also examined 
using quartiles to better understand the functional form.  For both of these procedures, I 
use a data set excluding usually filtered variables and revenues less than or equal to 
zero.25
                                                 
24 I performed a follow-up analysis which showed, for a data set of only government-funded organizations, 
a similar pattern of hazard ratios. 
 The results are presented in Table 3D (time-varying percentage) and Table 3E 
(quartiles from average percentage). 
25 I wish to avoid labeling negatively-valued percentages and percentages which erroneously show a result 
of zero because of a division by 0 problem.   
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Table 3D: Cox Regression Estimate of Hazard of Organizational Closure with Time-
Dependent Government Funding as Percent of Revenue 
Independent Variables β  (SE) Hazard Ratio 
Arts, Culture, and Humanities (AR) -1.052 (.094) *** -65.1 
Education (ED) -0.956 (.093) *** -61.6 
Environment and Animals (EN) -1.114 (.099) *** -67.2 
Health (HE) -1.000 (.093) *** -63.2 
Higher Education (BH) -1.260 (.121) *** -71.6 
Hospitals (EH) -0.730 (.103) *** -51.8 
Human Services (HU) -1.039 (.092) *** -64.6 
International, Foreign Affairs (IN) -0.828 (.113) *** -56.3 
Mutual/Membership Benefit (MU) -0.564 (.137) *** -43.1 
Public, Societal Benefit (PU) -0.851 (.093) *** -57.3 
Religion Related (RE) -0.599 (.095) *** -45.1 
Age -0.002 (.000) *** -0.2 
Size TV (in $100000s) -0.002 (.000) *** -0.2 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts Pct. TV  -0.005 (.000) *** -0.5 
-2 Log likelihood 502629.2 
- 2 LL model chi-square 885.4 *** 
Number of events (exits) 21531 of 128779 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05  # p < .1 
Note : Standard errors in parentheses. 
The NTEE category for “Unknown” is excluded, so dummy variable for NTEE subsector 
is in comparison to the Unknown category. 
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Table 3E: Cox Regression Estimate of Hazard of Organizational Closure with 
Government Funding as Percent of Revenue Quartiles 
Independent Variables β  (SE) Hazard Ratio 
Arts, Culture, and Humanities (AR) -0.880 (.094)*** -58.5 
Education (ED) -0.953 (.093)*** -61.4 
Environment and Animals (EN) -0.987 (.099)*** -62.7 
Health (HE) -0.940 (.093)*** -60.9 
Higher Education (BH) -1.101 (.121)*** -66.7 
Hospitals (EH) -0.690 (.103)*** -49.8 
Human Services (HU) -0.946 (.092)*** -61.2 
International, Foreign Affairs (IN) -0.823 (.113)*** -56.1 
Mutual/Membership Benefit (MU) -0.624 (.137)*** -46.4 
Public, Societal Benefit (PU) -0.826 (.093)*** -56.2 
Religion Related (RE) -0.657 (.095)*** -48.1 
Age -0.002 (.000)*** -0.2 
Size TV (in $100000s) -0.001 (.000)*** -0.1 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts Pct. Q1 -0.871 (.031)*** -58.1 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts Pct. Q2 -0.671 (.028)*** -48.9 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts Pct. Q3 -0.589 (.027)*** -44.5 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts Pct. Q4 -0.433 (.025)*** -35.1 
-2 Log likelihood 501053.2 
- 2 LL model chi-square 2526.1 *** 
Number of events (exits) 21531 of 128779 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05  # p < .1 
Note : Standard errors in parentheses. 
The NTEE category for “Unknown” is excluded, so dummy variables for NTEE subsector are 
analyzed in comparison to the Unknown category. 
The category for zero-funded organizations is excluded, so dummy variables for the quartiles of 
government funding percentage are analyzed in comparison to zero-funded organizations. 
 
The continuous variable has a beta of -0.00526
                                                 
26 With the unfiltered data set, the variable has a beta of  -0.005 and each 1 percent increase in government 
funding decreases the hazard of closure by 0.5 percent.  For the more extensively filtered data set, the 
variable has a beta of -0.002 and each 1 percent increase in government funding decreases the hazard of 
closure by 0.2 percent. 
 and demonstrates that every 1 
percent of additional funding decreases the hazard of exit by 0.5 percent.  The results of 
the quartile analysis included decreased betas for several of the sector variables and the 
size variable.  However, more interesting is the results for the quartiles.  The betas for the 
funding quartiles were -0.865, -0.658, -0.577, and –.427.  This indicates that 
organizations in the smallest quartiles of government funding actually had the biggest 
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decrease in hazard of failure (67.9% decrease) compared to non-government-funded 
organizations.  It also indicates that the negative beta in Table 3D is capturing the effect 
of the presence of government funding as well as the marginal effect of funding 
increases.  Although Model 4 fails to reject the null hypothesis just as Models 1, 2, and 3 
did, it also begins to uncover a more nuanced view of the effects of government funding. 
Because of the results of Model 4, I conducted a sensitivity analysis to separate 
the effects of the presence of government funding from the effects of funding increases.  I 
replicated the analysis for Model 4 using a data set of only government-funded 
organizations.  Based on the results of Model 4, I would expect that, when government-
funded organizations are compared only to other government-funded organizations, 
additional proportions of revenue would lead to an increase in the hazard of failure.  The 
results are presented in Table 3F. 
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Table 3F: Only Government-funded Organizations, Cox Regression Estimate of Hazard 
of Closure with Time-Dependent Government Funding as Percent of Revenue 
Independent Variables β  (SE) Hazard 
Ratio 
Arts, Culture, and Humanities (AR) -1.313 (0.200) *** -73.1 
Education (ED) -1.256 (0.201) *** -71.5 
Environment and Animals (EN) -1.334 (0.208) *** -73.7 
Health (HE) -1.275 (0.199) *** -72.1 
Higher Education (BH) -1.638 (0.240) *** -80.6 
Hospitals (EH) -1.121 (0.221) *** -67.4 
Human Services (HU) -1.266 (0.197) *** -71.8 
International, Foreign Affairs (IN) -1.161 (0.259) *** -68.7 
Mutual/Membership Benefit (MU) -1.996 (0.734) ** -86.4 
Public, Societal Benefit (PU) -1.086 (0.200) *** -66.2 
Religion Related (RE) -0.964 (0.225) *** -61.9 
Age -0.003 (0.001) ** -0.3 
Size TV (in $100000s) -0.001 (0.000) *** -0.1 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts Pct. TV  0.000 (0.000) *** 0.0 
-2 Log likelihood 132456.7 
- 2 LL model chi-square 194.130 *** 
Number of events (exits) 6100 of 54772 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05  # p < .1 
Note : Standard errors in parentheses. 
The NTEE category for “Unknown” is excluded, so dummy variable for NTEE subsector 
is in comparison to the Unknown category. 
 
 
This analysis shows marginal increase in average percent of government funding 
led to a very small (the 0.0 shown in the hazard rate column is actually a positive result of 
less than 0.05 percent) positive percent increase in the hazard of failure (significant at the 
.001 level).  This result is consistent with the pattern that emerged in Table 3E.  It is 
useful to examine this result more carefully using quartiles formed from the percent of 
government funding. 
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Table 3G: Only Government-funded Organizations, Cox Regression Estimate of Hazard 
of Closure with Government Funding as Percent of Revenue Quartiles 
Independent Variables β  (SE) Hazard 
Ratio 
Arts, Culture, and Humanities (AR) -1.239 (0.200) *** -71.0 
Education (ED) -1.236 (0.201) *** -70.9 
Environment and Animals (EN) -1.282 (0.208) *** -72.3 
Health (HE) -1.290 (0.199) *** -72.5 
Higher Education (BH) -1.507 (0.240) *** -77.8 
Hospitals (EH) -0.958 (0.221) *** -61.6 
Human Services (HU) -1.285 (0.197) *** -72.3 
International, Foreign Affairs (IN) -1.122 (0.259) *** -67.4 
Mutual/Membership Benefit (MU) -1.995 (0.734) *** -86.4 
Public, Societal Benefit (PU) -1.090 (0.200) *** -66.4 
Religion Related (RE) -0.906 (0.225) *** -59.6 
Age -0.003 (0.001) ** -0.3 
Size TV (in $100000s) -0.001 (0.000) *** -0.1 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts Pct. Q2 0.229 (0.040) *** 25.8 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts Pct. Q3 0.312 (0.040) *** 36.6 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts Pct. Q4 0.462 (0.039) *** 58.7 
-2 Log likelihood 132327.5 
- 2 LL model chi-square 282.5 *** 
Number of events (exits) 6100 of 54772 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05  # p < .1 
Note : Standard errors in parentheses. 
The NTEE category for “Unknown” is excluded, so dummy variables for NTEE subsector are 
analyzed in comparison to the Unknown category. 
The category for the lowest-percentage organizations is excluded, so dummy variables for the 
quartiles of government funding percentage are analyzed in comparison to Q1 organizations. 
 
As Table 3G shows, when only government-funded organizations are analyzed, an 
increase in the percentage of government funds for the first time allows one to reject the 
null hypothesis.  For the largest quartile of government funding, there is a 58.7 increased 
hazard of failure when compared to the smallest quartile of government funding. 
 
Alternative Methods and Variables – Lagged Variables 
The Cox regression can either be calculated with the funding level for the current 
year or the previous year’s funding level as the variable of interest.  I next use a Cox 
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regression to consider government grant and contract funding in a particular period, 
rather than funding lagged one year.  I use the usually filtered dataset for this analysis. 
Although the regression corresponding to Model 1 above did not converge27
Table 3H: Cox Regression Estimate of Hazard of Closure with Non-Lagged, Time-
Dependent Government Funding 
, the 
regression corresponding to Model 4 (based on the percent of government funds) did.  
The results are presented in Table 3H. 
Independent Variables β  (SE) Hazard Ratio 
Arts, Culture, and Humanities (AR) -1.000 (.093) *** -63.2 
Education (ED) -0.934 (.092) *** -60.7 
Environment and Animals (EN) -1.056 (.098) *** -65.2 
Health (HE) -0.846 (.092) *** -57.1 
Higher Education (BH) -1.019 (.119) *** -63.9 
Hospitals (EH) -0.785 (.103) *** -54.4 
Human Services (HU) -0.886 (.091) *** -58.8 
International, Foreign Affairs (IN) -0.797 (.111) *** -54.9 
Mutual/Membership Benefit (MU) -0.587 (.135) *** -44.4 
Public, Societal Benefit (PU) -0.810 (.092) *** -55.5 
Religion Related (RE) -0.648 (.093) *** -47.7 
Age -0.002 (.000) *** -0.2 
Nonlag Size TV (in $100000s) -0.006 (.000) *** -0.6 
Nonlag Gov’t Grants and Contracts Pct. TV (in 
$100000s) -0.022 (.000) *** -2.2 
-2 Log likelihood 512287.7 
- 2 LL model chi-square 1746.4 *** 
Number of events (exits) 22162 of 132396 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05  # p < .1 
Note : Standard errors in parentheses. 
The NTEE category for “Unknown” is excluded, so dummy variable for NTEE subsector is in 
comparison to the Unknown category. 
 
The two variables which the change in lagging affects are the size and 
government grants and contracts variables.  The size beta is -0.006, showing a 0.6 percent 
decrease in the hazard of exit for each $100,000 in additional expenditures.  The 
government variable had a beta of -0.022, corresponding with a 2.2 percent decrease in 
                                                 
27 Did not lead to a valid result in the number of iterations given. 
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the hazard of exit for each additional $100,000 in government funding.  These can be 
compared to the values for Model 1, which included a decrease in the hazard of exit of 
0.2 percent for size and 0.5 percent for government funding.   
The regressions including non-lagged variables corresponding to Model 2 and 
Model 3 also converged, although the direction of the change between the lagged and 
non-lagged variables was inconsistent with Model 4.  The regression corresponding to 
Model 2 had a Beta of -0.567, indicating a decrease of 43.3 percent in the hazard of exit 
for organizations with government funding. (The lagged model had a corresponding 
decrease of 45.9 percent).  The quartiles in the regression corresponding to Model 3 had 
Betas of -0.533, -0.454, -0.590, and -0.750, corresponding with respective decreases in 
the hazard of exit of 41.3, 36.5, 44.6, and 52.7 percent.  (The lagged model had 
corresponding decreases of 41.6, 37.2, 46.0, and 60.2 percent.)  
 
Alternative Methods and Variables – Government Funding Definition 
The correlation between government funding and nonprofit exit have been 
consistently negative when considering grant and contract funding.  However, 
government funding can also be defined as only funding from contracts, or funding from 
contracts, grants, as well as Medicare and Medicaid.  First, I calculate the results of 
Model 1 when government funding is defined as grants.  The results are shown in Table 
3I. 
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Table 3I: Cox Regression Estimate of Hazard of Organizational Closure with Time-
Dependent Government Funding (Defined as Grants) 
Independent Variables β  (SE) Hazard Ratio 
Arts, Culture, and Humanities (AR) -1.045 (.093) *** -64.8 
Education (ED) -0.953 (.092) *** -61.4 
Environment and Animals (EN) -1.112 (.098) *** -67.1 
Health (HE) -0.995 (.092) *** -63.0 
Higher Education (BH) -1.222 (.120) *** -70.5 
Hospitals (EH) -0.768 (.102) *** -53.6 
Human Services (HU) -1.046 (.091) *** -64.9 
International, Foreign Affairs (IN) -0.796 (.111) *** -54.9 
Mutual/Membership Benefit (MU) -0.568 (.135) *** -43.3 
Public, Societal Benefit (PU) -0.855 (.092) *** -57.5 
Religion Related (RE) -0.585 (.093) *** -44.3 
Age -0.002 (.000) *** -0.2 
Size TV (in $100000s) -0.001 (.000) *** -0.1 
Gov’t Grants TV (in $100000s) -0.023 (.001) *** -2.3 
-2 Log likelihood 518521.082 
- 2 LL model chi-square 829.490 *** 
Number of events (exits) 22162 of 132396 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05  # p < .1 
Note : Standard errors in parentheses. 
The NTEE category for “Unknown” is excluded, so dummy variable for NTEE subsector is in 
comparison to the Unknown category. 
 
The beta for the definition of government funding including only grants is -0.023, 
corresponding to a decrease in the hazard of exit of 2.3 percent for each additional 
$100,000 in grants.  This is a larger decrease than the 2.1 percent associated with grants 
and contracts. 
Next, I calculate the results of Model 1 when government funding is defined as 
grants, contracts, and Medicare/Medicaid funding.  The results are shown in Table 3J. 
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Table 3J: Cox Regression Estimate of Hazard of Organizational Closure with Time-
Dependent Government Funding (Defined as Grants, Contracts, Medicare/Medicaid) 
Independent Variables β  (SE) Hazard Ratio 
Arts, Culture, and Humanities (AR) -1.053 (.093) *** -65.1 
Education (ED) -0.962 (.092) *** -61.8 
Environment and Animals (EN) -1.120 (.098) *** -67.4 
Health (HE) -1.016 (.092) *** -63.8 
Higher Education (BH) -1.268 (.120) *** -71.9 
Hospitals (EH) -0.741 (.102) *** -52.3 
Human Services (HU) -1.069 (.091) *** -65.7 
International, Foreign Affairs (IN) -0.809 (.111) *** -55.5 
Mutual/Membership Benefit (MU) -0.566 (.135) *** -43.2 
Public, Societal Benefit (PU) -0.868 (.092) *** -58.0 
Religion Related (RE) -0.583 (.093) *** -44.2 
Age -0.002 (.000) *** -0.2 
Size TV (in $100000s) -0.001 (.000) *** -0.1 
Gov’t Grants, Contracts, and Medicare/Medicaid 
TV (in $100000s) -0.006 (.001) *** -0.6 
-2 Log likelihood 518837.302 
- 2 LL model chi-square 727.048 *** 
Number of events (exits) 22162 of 132396 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05  # p < .1 
Note : Standard errors in parentheses. 
The NTEE category for “Unknown” is excluded, so dummy variable for NTEE subsector is in 
comparison to the Unknown category. 
 
The beta for the definition of government funding including only grants is -0.006, 
corresponding to a decrease in the hazard of exit of 0.6 percent for each additional 
$100,000 in grants.  This is a smaller decrease than the 2.1 percent associated with grants 
and contracts.  Therefore, each of the two alternative definitions is consistent with the 
primary definition and likewise allows us to reject the null hypothesis. 
 
Alternative Methods and Variables – Binary Logistic Regression 
Although a Cox regression is the typical means of analyzing survival, binary 
logistic regression is sometimes used, as discussed in Chapter 2.  I calculate this 
alternative regression here to show that the results are not sensitive to the method of 
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analysis.  The results of the binary logistic regression, in which exit is the dependent 
variable and the independent variables include sectors, age, the average size, and the 
average government grant and contract funding, are shown in Table 3K. 
Table 3K: Binary Logistic Regression with Government Funding as a Predictor Variable 
for Organizational Closure 
Independent Variables β  (SE) Hazard Ratio 
Constant -0.333 (.117)**  
Arts, Culture, and Humanities (AR) -1.263 (.120) *** -71.7 
Education (ED) -1.161 (.119) *** -68.7 
Environment and Animals (EN) -1.335 (.124) *** -73.7 
Health (HE) -1.206 (.119) *** -70.1 
Higher Education (BH) -1.481 (.144) *** -77.3 
Hospitals (EH) -0.992 (.129) *** -62.9 
Human Services (HU) -1.257 (.118) *** -71.6 
International, Foreign Affairs (IN) -0.983 (.138) *** -62.6 
Mutual/Membership Benefit (MU) -0.704 (.165) *** -50.5 
Public, Societal Benefit (PU) -1.050 (.119) *** -65.0 
Religion Related (RE) -0.739 (.121) *** -52.3 
Age -0.002 (.001) *** -0.2 
AVG Size (in $100000s) -0.001 (.000) *** -0.1 
AVG Gov’t Grants and Contracts (in $100000s) -0.022 (.001) *** -2.2 
-2 Log likelihood 118216.030 
Cox & Snell R Square .010 
Nagelkerke R Square .018 
Number of events (exits) 22162 of 132396 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05  # p < .1 
Note : Standard errors in parentheses. 
The NTEE category for “Unknown” is excluded, so dummy variable for NTEE subsector is in 
comparison to the Unknown category. 
 
Like the Cox regression, the binary logistic regression fails to reject the null 
hypothesis.  The binary logistic regression produced a Beta of -0.022, indicating that each 
additional $100,000 in average grant and contract funding decreased the odds of exit by 
2.2 percent (significant at the 0.001 level). 
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Hypothesis 2 
According to structural embeddedness theories, the funding with a greatest affect on 
survival should be funding with characteristics that affect reliance of an organization on 
that funding source, including source size or long period of source stability.  As discussed 
in Chapter 1, the most common difference cited between government funding and other 
revenue streams is the relative stability or instability of the government funds, although 
there is disagreement in the literature about how government funding compares to the 
other forms of funding.  (See “Organizational Adaptation and Government Funding 
Stability” in Chapter 1.)  Therefore, I next analyze the stability of government funding 
compared to other sources and the relationship between stability and nonprofit exit.   
 
Hypothesis H0
To determine the relative stability of government funding, I begin by calculating 
the stability, for each organization, of funding over time, as I describe in the “Steadiness” 
section of Chapter 2.  Each organization, therefore, has a standard deviation and a 
coefficient of variation for every funding type, including government grants; government 
grants and contracts; government grants, contracts, and Medicare/Medicaid payments; 
donated income with special events and dues; and other income.  
2A: Government funding and other types of funding received by 
individual nonprofits are equally stable over time. 
To test the hypothesis of equal stability, I must test the equality of means of the 
variables of interest, specifically examining the government variables in relationship to 
the donated and other income variables.  To test the equality of means of the within-
organization standard deviations, a non-parametric test is most appropriate because the 
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variables cannot be assumed to be normally distributed.28  For the coefficient of variation 
variables, a parametric test is most appropriate, because dividing the standard deviation 
of the organization’s funding over time by the organization’s within-variable mean 
created a more normal distribution for 3 of the 5 variables.29
Among the various tests, those designed for paired variables are most appropriate 
because the variables being analyzed both exist within the same nonprofit.  A second 
reason for treating the variables as paired stems from the likely correlation among the 
variables according to the research on crowding-in and crowding-out.  Here, I choose a 
nonparametric Wilcoxson Signed Ranks test for the standard deviation data (Table 3L) 
and the paired sample t-test for the coefficient of variation data (Table 3M), which is 
mostly normal, except for the Donated and Other Funding variables.  Cases are excluded 
pairwise.   
  
                                                 
28 The lack of normality is indicated, in a cursory way, by observation of the mean and median values for 
these variables, and I confirm this non-normal distribution through tests revealing the skewness and 
kurtosis of the data.  (Skewness ranges from 29.3 to 76.0, while kurtosis ranges from 1,280 to 8,013. 
29 The three government variables have skewness ranging from 2.0 to 2.1 and kurtosis ranging from 3.0 to 
3.2.  The donated revenue variable skewness rose to 109.4 (kurtosis of 19,368), while the other revenue 
variable skewness rose to 124.1 (kurtosis of 20,095). 
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Table 3L: Wilcoxson Signed Ranks Test Comparing Standard-Deviation-Based 
Steadiness for Major Types of Nonprofit-Organization Funding 
Steadiness (Variable) 
Var. 
Mean 
Var. 
Med-
ian 
Var. 
Std. 
Dev. Test Statistics N30 
Steadiness  (Government Grants) 2.38 .39 10.43 -15.406b 25784 *** 
 Steadiness  (Gov’t Grants, Contracts) 2.97 .45 14.58 
Steadiness (Government Grants) 2.38 .39 10.43 -17.326b 25784 *** 
Steadiness (Gov’t Grants, Contracts, Medic.) 5.01 .48 37.84 
Steadiness (Gov’t Grants, Contracts) 2.97 .45 14.58 -12.910b 27718 *** 
Steadiness (Gov’t Grants, Contracts, Medic.) 5.01 .48 37.84 
Steadiness (Government Grants) 2.38 .39 10.43 -3.326b 24028 *** 
 Steadiness (Private Rev. w/ SpEv, Dues) 2.49 .33 21.55 
Steadiness (Gov’t Grants, Contracts) 2.97 .45 14.58 -6.854a 25396 *** 
Steadiness (Private Rev. w/ SpEv, Dues) 2.49 33 21.55 
Steadiness (Gov’t Grants, Contracts, Medic.) 5.01 .48 37.84 -14.064a 25894 *** 
 Steadiness (Private Rev. w/ SpEv, Dues) 2.49 .33 21.55 
Steadiness (Government Grants) 2.38 .39 10.43 -2.396b 25659 * 
 Steadiness (Other Rev.) 6.39 .26 76.40 
Steadiness (Gov’t Grants, Contracts) 2.97 .45 14.58 -0.006 27584 a  
 Steadiness (Other Rev.) 6.39 .26 76.40 
Steadiness (Gov’t Grants, Contracts, Medic.) 5.01 .48 37.84 -7.552a 28187 *** 
 Steadiness (Other Rev.) 6.39 .26 76.40 
Note:  a = based on positive ranks; b=based on negative ranks 
Significance: *** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05  # p < .1 
 
 
                                                 
30 This analysis was conducted with non-zero values in a 10% sample of the usually included variables, 
which is the reason for the small N variables.   
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Table 3M: Paired Sample T-Test Comparing Coefficient-of-Variation-Based Steadiness for Major Types of Nonprofit-Organization 
Funding 
Note: Standard errors of the Mean and of the Difference of Mean are in parentheses. 
Significance: *** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05  # p < .1
Steadiness Co. of Var.  (Variable) Var. Mean 
Var. 
Std. 
Dev. 
Difference 
of Mean 
(1st-2nd
Std. 
Dev ) 
95% 
CI 
Low-
er 
95% 
CI 
Up-
per t N 
Corre-
lation 
Steadiness Co. of Var. (Gov’t Grants) .822 (.003) .715 .041 (.001) 
*** 
  
.232  
  
.039 
  
.043 
  
40.2 
  
51372 
  
.946 
*** 
  
Steadiness Co. of Var. (Gov’t Grants, Contracts) .781 (.003) .696 
Steadiness Co. of Var. (Gov’t Grants) .822 (.003) .715 .045 (.001) 
*** 
  
.255  
  
.043 
  
.047 
  
40.1 
  
51371 
  
.935 
*** 
  
Steadiness Co. of Var. (Gov’t Grants, Contracts, Medic.) .777 (.003) .692 
Steadiness Co. of Var. (Gov’t Grants, Contracts) .791 (.003) .697 .007 (.001) 
*** 
  
.124  
  
.006 
  
.008 
  
13.8 
  
55224 
  
.984 
*** 
  
Steadiness Co. of Var. (Gov’t Grants, Contracts, Medic.) .784 (.003) .691 
Steadiness Co. of Var. (Gov’t Grants) .832 (.003) .714  .228 (.005) 
*** 
  
1.175  
  
.217 
  
.238 
  
42.3 47820 
  
.056 
*** 
  
Steadiness Co. of Var. (Private Rev. w/ SpEv, Dues) .605 (.004) .974  
Steadiness Co. of Var. (Gov’t Grants, Contracts) .801 (.003) .696  .193 (.006) 
*** 
  
1.25  
  
.182 
  
.204 
  
34.7 
  
50531 
  
.047 
*** 
  
Steadiness Co. of Var. (Private Rev.  w/ SpEv, Dues) .608 (.005) 1.069 
Steadiness Co. of Var. (Gov’t Grants, Contracts, Medic.) .802 (.003) .694 .190 (.005) 
*** 
  
1.24 .179 
  
.200 
  
34.7 
  
51547 
  
.048 
*** 
  
Steadiness Co. of Var. (Private Rev.  w/ SpEv, Dues) .612 (.005) 1.062 
Steadiness Co. of Var. (Gov’t Grants) .825 (.003) .715 .324 (.080) 
***  
  
18.0  
  
.168 
  
.480 
  
4.07 
  
51139 
  
-0.004 
  Steadiness Co. of Var. (Other Rev. w/out Gov’t, Private) .501 (.079) 18.0 
Steadiness Co. of Var. (Gov’t Grants, Contracts) .794 (.003) .697 .278 (.074) 
*** 
  
17.4  
  
.133 
  
.423 
  
3.75 
  
54963 
  
-0.002 
  Steadiness Co. of Var. (Other Rev. w/out Gov’t, Private) .516 (.074) 17.3 
Steadiness Co. of Var. (Gov’t Grants, Contracts, Medic.) .795 (.003) .695 .286 (.072) 
*** 
  
17.2  
  
.144 
  
.428 
  
3.95 
  
56202 
  
-0.002 
  Steadiness Co. of Var. (Other Rev. w/out Gov’t, Private) .510 (.072) 17.2 
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Table 3L shows that the government funding definition including government 
grants tends to have a smaller standard deviation than the one including grants and 
contracts, which in turn tends to have a smaller standard deviation than the one including 
grants, contracts, and Medicare/Medicaid.  Each of these differences is significantly 
different from 0 at the .001 level.  The private funding variable (which includes special 
events and dues) has a larger mean standard deviation than the government funding 
definition including only grants, but a smaller mean standard deviation than the 
government funding definition including grants and contracts and the definition including 
grants, contracts, and Medicare/Medicaid.  Each of these pairs’ differences is 
significantly different from 0 at the .001 level.  For the other funding variable, the 
government funding variable including only grants is smaller and is significantly 
different from 0 at the .05 level.  The government funding variable including grants, 
contracts, and Medicare/Medicaid is larger than the other funding variable and is 
significantly different from 0 at the .001 level.  The remaining definition is not 
significant.  I therefore reject the null hypothesis of equal steadiness, represented by 
standard deviations, for all but one of the pairs. 
Table 3M shows that each of the government funding variable definitions is less 
steady than the private and other funding variables.  Even taking into account the 
correlation of the variables, the government funding variable including only grants shows 
the least steadiness; this is followed by the variable including grants and contracts; this 
followed by the variable including grants, contracts, and Medicare/Medicaid definition, 
which has the greatest steadiness of the three.  Because all results were shown to be 
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significant at the .001 level, we can reject the null hypotheses that there is no difference 
in steadiness. 
 
Hypothesis H0
As discussed previously, the relative steadiness or unsteadiness of government 
funding is often discussed as a reason for the difference in failure for government-funded 
nonprofits.  If steadiness of a funding source impacts the failure rate of those nonprofits 
receiving it, then government-funded nonprofits with less steady government funding 
should have increased failure rates.  To test this hypothesis, I conduct a Cox regression 
including the coefficient of variation for the government funding variable to represent 
steadiness.  As an alternative measure, I include the standard deviation for the 
government funding variable.   
2B: Among those nonprofits with government funding, those with 
unsteady government funding are equally or less likely to fail than those with 
steady funding.   
 
Method 1 
I first analyze the hypothesis using the coefficient of variation of the government 
funding variable to represent steadiness.  The results are shown in Table 3N. 
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Table 3N: Cox Regression Estimate of Hazard of Organizational Closure with Time-
Dependent Government Funding and Coefficient-of-Variation-Based Government 
Funding Steadiness  
Independent Variables β  (SE) Hazard Ratio 
Arts, Culture, and Humanities (AR) -0.959 (.093) *** -61.7 
Education (ED) -0.967 (.092) *** -62.0 
Environment and Animals (EN) -1.013 (.098) *** -63.7 
Health (HE) -0.962 (.092) *** -61.8 
Higher Education (BH) -1.222 (.120) *** -70.5 
Hospitals (EH) -0.744 (.102) *** -52.5 
Human Services (HU) -0.985 (.091) *** -62.7 
International, Foreign Affairs (IN) -0.796 (.111) *** -54.9 
Mutual/Membership Benefit (MU) -0.628 (.135) *** -46.6 
Public, Societal Benefit (PU) -0.840 (.092) *** -56.8 
Religion Related (RE) -0.647 (.093) *** -47.6 
Age -0.002 (.000) *** -0.2 
Size TV (in $100000s) -0.001 (.000) *** -0.1 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts TV (in $100000s) -0.020 (.001) *** -2.0 
Steadiness Co. of Var. (Gov’t Grants, Contracts)  -0.500 (.015) *** -39.3 
-2 Log likelihood 517148.978 
- 2 LL model chi-square 1961.679 *** 
Number of events (exits) 22162 of 132396 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05  # p < .1 
Note : Standard errors in parentheses. 
The NTEE category for “Unknown” is excluded, so dummy variable for NTEE subsector is in 
comparison to the Unknown category. 
 
The above results show that the coefficient of variation has a beta of -0.500, 
showing a decrease in the odds of exit of 39.3 percent for every additional 1 coefficient 
of variation (a variation equal to the average amounts of grants and contracts).  This is an 
unexpected result, which is essentially indicating that nonprofits with less steady 
revenues are less likely to exit (and more likely to survive).  Based on additional research 
into the previous methods used to demonstrate steadiness (by Kingma and others), there 
is reason to suspect that this result is an effect of misspecification.  Based only on the 
results of the analysis and the current method of calculating the steadiness variable, I fail 
to reject the null hypothesis.   
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Method 2 
I next analyze the hypothesis using the standard deviation of the government 
funding variable to represent steadiness.  The results are shown in Table 3O. 
Table 3O: Cox Regression Estimate of Hazard of Organizational Closure with Time-
Dependent Government Funding and Standard-Deviation-Based Government Funding 
Steadiness  
Independent Variables β  (SE) Hazard Ratio 
Arts, Culture, and Humanities (AR) -1.042 (.093) *** -64.7 
Education (ED) -0.951 (.092) *** -61.4 
Environment and Animals (EN) -1.103 (.098) *** -66.8 
Health (HE) -0.981 (.092) *** -62.5 
Higher Education (BH) -1.226 (.120) *** -70.7 
Hospitals (EH) -0.787 (.102) *** -54.5 
Human Services (HU) -1.032 (.091) *** -64.4 
International, Foreign Affairs (IN) -0.787 (.111) ***  -54.5 
Mutual/Membership Benefit (MU) -0.571 (.135) *** -43.5 
Public, Societal Benefit (PU) -0.849 (.092) *** -57.2 
Religion Related (RE) -0.587 (.093) *** -44.4 
Age -0.002 (.000) *** -0.2 
Size TV (in $100000s) -0.001 (.000) *** -0.1 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts TV (in $100000s) -0.011 (.002) *** -1.1 
Steadiness (Gov’t Grants, Contracts) -0.047 (.005) *** -4.6 
-2 Log likelihood 518348.131 
- 2 LL model chi-square 840.812 *** 
Number of events (exits) 22162 of 132396 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05  # p < .1 
Note : Standard errors in parentheses. 
The NTEE category for “Unknown” is excluded, so dummy variable for NTEE subsector is in 
comparison to the Unknown category. 
 
The above results show that the coefficient of variation has a beta of -0.047, 
showing a decrease in the odds of exit of 4.6 percent for every 1 unit increase in the 
standard deviation.  Based on this analysis, I also fail to reject the null hypothesis.   
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Hypothesis H0
Although the relationship between grant and contracts steadiness and exit was not 
clear from the above analyses, it is unclear if the correlations between various funding 
sources mean that, when an organization loses or wins government support, it changes 
how it pursues other sources of funding or the costs it incurs.  I therefore am interested in 
examining the effects of financial variables that represent the organization’s complete 
financial situation.   
2C: Nonprofits with unsteady revenue/expenditures are equally or 
less likely to fail than nonprofits with steady expenditures. 
 
Method 1 
I first analyze the effect of overall revenue stability on survival, controlling for 
government funding.  This also will allow for the interpretation of the effect of 
government funding after controlling for stability of revenues overall.  I use the 
coefficient of variation rather than the standard deviation because it is more normally 
distributed.  The results of Cox regressions including the coefficient of variation for total 
revenue are shown in Table 3P.  
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Table 3P: Cox Regression Estimate of Hazard of Organizational Closure with Time-
Dependent Government Funding and Coefficient-of-Variation-Based Revenue Steadiness  
Independent Variables β  (SE) Hazard Ratio 
Arts, Culture, and Humanities (AR) -1.047 (.093) *** -64.9 
Education (ED) -0.953 (.092) *** -61.4 
Environment and Animals (EN) -1.112 (.098) *** -67.1 
Health (HE) -0.991 (.092) *** -62.9 
Higher Education (BH) -1.233 (.120) *** -70.9 
Hospitals (EH) -0.780 (.102) *** -54.2 
Human Services (HU) -1.042 (.091) *** -64.7 
International, Foreign Affairs (IN) -0.797 (.111) ***  -54.9 
Mutual/Membership Benefit (MU) -0.569 (.135) *** -43.4 
Public, Societal Benefit (PU) -0.855 (.092) *** -57.5 
Religion Related (RE) -0.585 (.093) *** -44.3 
Age -0.002 (.000) *** -0.2 
Size TV (in $100000s) -0.001 (.000) *** -0.1 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts TV (in $100000s) -0.021 (.001) *** -2.1 
Steadiness Co. of Var. (Revenue) -0.002 (.003) -0.2 
-2 Log likelihood 518477.984 
- 2 LL model chi-square 826.419 *** 
Number of events (exits) 22162 of 132396 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05  # p < .1 
Note : Standard errors in parentheses. 
The NTEE category for “Unknown” is excluded, so dummy variable for NTEE subsector is in 
comparison to the Unknown category. 
 
Although the government grants and contracts variable remains negative and 
significant, the variable for steadiness of revenue is insignificant.  Therefore, we fail to 
reject the null hypothesis that nonprofits with unsteady revenue are equally or less likely 
to exit. 
 
Method 2 
I next analyze the effect of overall expenditure stability on survival, continuing to 
control for government funding and size of the organization (which is also draws from 
the expenditure variable).  I use the coefficient of variation rather than the standard 
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deviation because it is more normally distributed.  The results of Cox regressions 
including the coefficient of variation for Expenditures are shown in Table 3Q.  
 
Table 3Q: Cox Regression Estimate of Hazard of Organizational Closure with Time-
Dependent Government Funding and Coefficient-of-Variation-Based Expenditure 
Steadiness  
Independent Variables β  (SE) Hazard Ratio 
Arts, Culture, and Humanities (AR) -1.044 (.093) *** -64.8 
Education (ED) -0.953 (.092) *** -61.4 
Environment and Animals (EN) -1.119 (.098) *** -67.3 
Health (HE) -0.993 (.092) *** -62.9 
Higher Education (BH) -1.227 (.120) *** -70.7 
Hospitals (EH) -0.797 (.102) ***  -54.9 
Human Services (HU) -1.031 (.091) *** -64.4 
International, Foreign Affairs (IN) -0.844 (.112) *** -57.0 
Mutual/Membership Benefit (MU) -0.601 (.135) *** -45.2 
Public, Societal Benefit (PU) -0.866 (.092) *** -57.9 
Religion Related (RE) -0.581 (.093) *** -44.1 
Age -0.002 (.000) *** -0.2 
Size TV (in $100000s) -0.001 (.000) *** -0.1 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts TV (in $100000s) -0.020 (.001) *** -2.0 
Steadiness Co. of Var. (Size) .232 (.017) *** 26.1 
-2 Log likelihood 518359.624 
- 2 LL model chi-square 825.770 *** 
Number of events (exits) 22162 of 132396 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05  # p < .1 
Note : Standard errors in parentheses. 
The NTEE category for “Unknown” is excluded, so dummy variable for NTEE subsector is in 
comparison to the Unknown category. 
 
In this regression the government grants and contracts variable remains negative 
and significant, and the variable for steadiness of size (expenditures) is significant at the 
.001 level.  The coefficient of 0.232 translates to a hazard ratio of 26.1, indicating an 
increase in the odds of exit of 39.3 percent for every additional 1 coefficient of variation 
(a variation equal to the average amount of expenditures).  Here, unsteadiness is 
correlated with increased odds of exit, and this is the first steadiness-related result where 
we can reject the null hypothesis.   
  77     
Hypothesis H0
To truly understand steadiness and government funding, it is important to explore 
multiple methods of untangling these two concepts.  If one supposes that a reason for the 
differences between government funding and other funding is the steadiness of each type 
of funding, than eliminating the differences in steadiness can help to uncover the 
presence or absence of other characteristics related to failure.  I therefore test the null 
hypothesis that, for organizations with relatively steady funding across all revenue 
sources, government funding will not be related to exit. 
2D: Among organizations with relatively steady funding across all 
sources, increases in government funding are not correlated with increased 
failure. 
To test this hypothesis I wanted to isolate all organizations with steady funding, 
even if it was no funding, for government grants, private funding (with special events and 
dues), and other revenue.  I measured steadiness using the coefficient of variation, and 
tested several levels of steadiness: 0.1, 0.25, and 0.5.  I created three dummy variables for 
the three levels of steadiness I wished to test: variance within 10% of mean, variance 
within 25% of mean, and variance within 50% of mean.  I then analyzed the relationship 
between funding and exit using a Cox regression that included a time-dependent variable 
for government funding (the variable of interest) and allowed it to interact with the 
dummy variables.  I also employed a second, alternative method where I included the 
interaction term as well as a separate time-dependent government variable.  The results of 
these two analyses are presented in Table 3R (primary model) and Table 3S (alternative 
model). 
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Table 3R: Cox Regression Estimate of Hazard of Organizational Closure with Time-Dependent Government Funding Interacting with 
Three Minimum Levels of Coefficient-of-Variation-Based Funding Steadiness  
Independent Variables β  (SE) Hazard Ratio β  (SE) 
Hazard 
Ratio β  (SE) 
Hazard 
Ratio 
Arts, Culture, Humanities (AR) -1.054 (.093) *** -65.1 -1.054 (.093) *** -65.1 -1.053 (.093) *** -65.1 
Education (ED) -.965 (.092) *** -61.9 -.965 (.092) *** -61.9 -.964 (.092) *** -61.9 
Environment and Animals (EN) -1.122 (.098) *** -67.4 -1.122 (.098) *** -67.4 -1.121 (.098) *** -67.4 
Health (HE) -1.033 (.092) *** -64.4 -1.033 (.092) *** -64.4 -1.028 (.092) *** -64.2 
Higher Education (BH) -1.265 (.120) *** -71.8 -1.258 (.120) *** -71.6 -1.250 (.120) *** -71.3 
Hospitals (EH) -.707 (.102) *** -50.7 -.709 (.102) *** -50.8 -.722 (.102) *** -51.4 
Human Services (HU) -1.084 (.091) *** -66.2 -1.084 (.091) *** -66.2 -1.078 (.091) *** -66 
International, Foreign Aff. (IN) -.814 (.111) *** -55.7 -.814 (.111) *** -55.7 -.812 (.111) *** -55.6 
Mutual/Membership Benefit (MU) -.561 (.135) *** -42.9 -.561 (.135) *** -42.9 -.562 (.135) *** -43 
Public, Societal Benefit (PU) -.874 (.092) *** -58.3 -.874 (.092) *** -58.3 -.872 (.092) *** -58.2 
Religion Related (RE) -.581 (.093) *** -44.1 -.581 (.093) *** -44.1 -.581 (.093) *** -44.1 
Age -.002 (.000) *** -0.2 -.002 (.000) *** -0.2 -.002 (.000) *** -0.2 
Size TV (in $100000s) -.002 (.000) *** -0.2 -.002 (.000) *** -0.2 -.002 (.000) *** -0.2 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts TV (in 
$100000s)*Co. of Var. <.1 .006 (.001) *** 0.6 ---  ---  
Gov’t Grants and Contracts TV (in 
$100000s)*Co. of Var. <.25 ---  .000 (.002) 0 ---  
Gov’t Grants and Contracts TV (in 
$100000s)*Co. of Var. <.5 ---  ---  -.007 (.001) *** -0.7 
- 2 Log likelihood 502887.072 502910.595 502912.577 
- 2 LL model chi-square 729.488 *** 707.906 *** 698.094 *** 
Number of events (exits) 21531 of 128779 21531 of 128779 21531 of 128779 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05  # p < .1    Note : Standard errors in parentheses.   
The NTEE category for “Unknown” is excluded, so dummy variable for NTEE subsector is in comparison to the Unknown category.
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Table 3S: Cox Regression Estimate of Hazard of Organizational Closure with Time-Dependent Government Funding and Three 
Minimum Levels of Coefficient-of-Variation-Based Steadiness Interacting with Time-Dependent Government Funding 
Independent Variables β  (SE) Haz. Rat. β  (SE) 
Haz. 
Rat. β  (SE) 
Haz. 
Rat. 
Arts, Culture, Humanities (AR) -1.047 (.093) *** -64.9 -1.046 (.093) *** -64.9 -1.048 (.093) *** -64.9 
Education (ED) -.952 (.092) *** -61.4 -.952 (.092) *** -61.4 -.952 (.092) *** -61.4 
Environment and Animals (EN) -1.111 (.098) *** -67.1 -1.110 (.098) *** -67 -1.111 (.098) *** -67.1 
Health (HE) -.988 (.092) *** -62.8 -.989 (.092) *** -62.8 -.989 (.092) *** -62.8 
Higher Education (BH) -1.235 (.120) *** -70.9 -1.231 (.120) *** -70.8 -1.247 (.120) *** -71.3 
Hospitals (EH) -.780 (.102) *** -54.2 -.778 (.102) *** -54.1 -.776 (.102) *** -54 
Human Services (HU) -1.039 (.091) *** -64.6 -1.039 (.091) *** -64.6 -1.040 (.091) *** -64.6 
International, Foreign Aff. (IN) -.797 (.111) *** -54.9 -.795 (.111) *** -54.8 -.795 (.111) *** -54.8 
Mutual/Membership Benefit (MU) -.570 (.135) *** -43.4 -.570 (.135) *** -43.5 -.571 (.135) *** -43.5 
Public, Societal Benefit (PU) -.854 (.092) *** -57.4 -.854 (.092) *** -57.4 -.853 (.092) *** -57.4 
Religion Related (RE) -.585 (.093) *** -44.3 -.586 (.093) *** -44.3 -.587 (.093) *** -44.4 
Age -.002 (.000) *** -0.2 -.002 (.000) *** -0.2 -.002 (.000) *** -0.2 
Size TV (in $100000s) -.001 (.000) *** -0.1 -.001 (.000) *** -0.1 -.001 (.000) *** -0.1 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts TV (in $100000s) -.023 (.001) *** -2.3 -.026 (.002) *** -2.6 -.032 (.002) *** -3.1 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts TV (in $100000s)*Co. of 
Var. <.1 .029 (.002) *** 2.9   ---  
Gov’t Grants and Contracts TV (in $100000s)*Co. of 
Var. <.25 ---  .025 (.002) *** 2.5 ---  
Gov’t Grants and Contracts TV (in $100000s)*Co. of 
Var. <.5 ---  ---  .023 (.002) *** 2.3 
- 2 Log likelihood 518418.707 581398.475 518387.759 
- 2 LL model chi-square 838.663 *** 836.300 *** 833.458 *** 
Number of events (exits) 22162 of 132396 22162 of 132396 22162 of 132396 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05  # p < .1    Note : Standard errors in parentheses. 
The NTEE category for “Unknown” is excluded, so dummy variable for NTEE subsector is in comparison to the Unknown category. 
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The interaction terms in Table 3R show the effect of additional government 
funding on organizations that have steady government funding.  When interpreting the 
beta and resulting hazard ratio, it is important to note that, because of the interaction 
term, this interaction variable is combining the effects of having steady funding across all 
sources and the effect of an increase in government funding, compared to all other non-
steady-revenue, non-government-funded organizations.  The results show three different 
relationships between government funding and exit for each of the three steadiness levels 
examined.  For organizations with less than a 0.1 coefficient of variation for each of the 
three main streams, each additional $100,000 in government funding is correlated with a 
0.6 percent increased hazard of exit (significant at the .001 level); this is the first analysis 
that has resulted in a positive sign for this variable.  When organizations with less than a 
0.25 coefficient of variation for each of the 3 main streams are considered, the interaction 
term is insignificant.  For organizations with a less than 0.5 coefficient of variation for 
each stream, each additional $100,000 in government funding is correlated with a 0.7 
percent decreased hazard of exit (significant at the .001 level).  Here, I reject the null 
hypothesis at the 0.1 level, but fail to reject the null hypothesis at the 0.25 and 0.5 levels. 
In Table 3S, the separate term for government funding has the effect of 
controlling for the amount of government funding.  The interaction term shows the 
additional effect of having specified level of steadiness on the effect of each additional 
$100,000 in government funding.  These two terms essentially split apart the effect 
shown in Table 3R.  Both the time-varying government funding term and the interaction 
term must be understood to interpret the effect of the funding on the hazard of exit.  For 
those organizations with some type of unsteady funding, government funding leads to a 
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decrease in the hazard of exit.  However, for those organizations with steady funding 
across all sources, this effect is moderated.  To understand the effect of additional dollars, 
one must combine the time-varying government funding term’s beta with the interaction 
term’s beta to understand the effect of funding for these organizations.   
For organizations with steady funding, an additional $100,000 in government 
funding combines a positive effect from the interaction term as well as a negative effect 
from the separate government funding term.  In a departure from the results shown in 
Hypothesis 1, the interaction term has a consistently positive beta.  Even when combined 
with the time-dependent government funding variable, the most steadily-funded 
organizations (<0.1 coefficient of variation for each of the three funding streams) have a 
positive beta.  Therefore, for this set of organizations, I fail to reject the null hypothesis 
once again. 
 
 
Hypothesis 3 
The third hypothesis focuses on the relationships between funding diversification 
and survival.  Literature states that the organizations that have a portfolio that is less 
diversified in favor of higher percentages of government funds have greater structural 
embeddedness towards those funds and are less likely to be able to replace them with 
other sources of funding (Foster and Fine 2007; Hodge and Piccolo 2005; Stone, Hager, 
and Griffin 2001).  Portfolio theory and limited empirical research suggest that nonprofits 
that are skilled at securing many sources of funding will be more likely to survive 
(Markovitz 1952; Kingma 1993; Hager 2001).  Furthermore, because the presence of 
government funding may be understood as a proxy for diversified funding, examining 
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diversification will help to uncover if the effects of government funding are really 
standing in for the effect of diversification.  Therefore, I use variables representing other 
funding and variables from finance theory describing concentration to examine the 
relationship between government funding and funding diversity for nonprofits. 
 
Hypothesis H0
First I will examine if the government funding variable loses significance if I 
include the donated and other funding variables.  I examine the effects of using both 
amounts and percentages funding to represent the additional funding streams.   
3A: After controlling for diversification in the form of other 
funding streams, organizations with government funding are equally or less likely 
to fail than non-government-funded nonprofits.   
 
Method 1 
In the first Cox regression analysis, I include private and other funding variables 
as time-varying.  I analyze the amount of funding in units of $100,000, consistent with 
my treatment of the size and government funding variables.  Because I am including all 
three revenue variables, I remove the size variable from the analysis to avoid a near-
linear relationship (the three revenue streams are assumed to be relatively equal to the 
expenditures variable in a typical nonprofit with a balanced budget).31
                                                 
31 I conducted a sensitivity analysis where I chose not to remove the size variable.  In that analysis, the size 
variable was insignificant, and the results for the other variables remain the same. 
  The results are 
shown in Table 3T.  
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Table 3T: Cox Regression Estimate of Hazard of Organizational Closure with Time-
Dependent Government, Private, and Other Funding 
Independent Variables β  (SE) Hazard Ratio 
Arts, Culture, and Humanities (AR) -0.976 (.093) *** -62.3 
Education (ED) -0.887 (.092) *** -58.8 
Environment and Animals (EN) -1.023 (.098) *** -64.0 
Health (HE) -0.923 (.092) *** -60.3 
Higher Education (BH) -0.917 (.120) *** -60.0 
Hospitals (EH) -0.837 (.102) *** -56.7 
Human Services (HU) -0.986 (.091) *** -62.7 
International, Foreign Affairs (IN) -0.652 (.111) *** -47.9 
Mutual/Membership Benefit (MU) -0.538 (.135) *** -41.6 
Public, Societal Benefit (PU) -0.765 (.092) *** -53.5 
Religion Related (RE) -0.527 (.093) *** -41.0 
Age -0.002 (.000) *** -0.2 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts TV (in $100000s) -0.028 (.001) *** -2.7 
Private Rev. W/ SpEv, Dues TV (in $100000s) -0.040 (.001) *** -3.9 
Other Rev. W/out Gov’t, Private Funds (in 
$100000s) TV .000 (.000) *** 0.0 
-2 Log likelihood 517170.323 
- 2 LL model chi-square 981.972 *** 
Number of events (exits) 22162 of 132396 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05  # p < .1 
Note : Standard errors in parentheses. 
The NTEE category for “Unknown” is excluded, so dummy variable for NTEE subsector is in 
comparison to the Unknown category. 
 
As demonstrated in the Table 3T, above, the government funding variable 
remains significant at the .001 level even with the inclusion of the two new revenue 
sources.  The coefficient increases slightly to -0.028 from -0.021 (see Table 3A), and the 
decrease is likely significant given that both have standard errors of 0.001.32
 
  Based on 
this analysis, I fail to reject the null hypothesis. 
                                                 
32 When the donations variable is restricted to include only donations (not special event revenue or dues), 
government funding remains significant at the .001, with a beta of -0.019.  The beta for private revenue in 
this analysis is -0.047, which is also significant at the .001 level.  
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Method 2  
In the second Cox regression analysis, I examine the private and other funding 
variables using “quartiles,” which are actually five groupings including a zero-funding 
group.  The usually-filtered organizations eliminate all organizations with negative 
government funding from the analysis, and I also filter organizations with negative values 
for private or other funding.  In this analysis, the omitted quartiles are the zero-funded 
organizations.  I also eliminate the size variable for consistency with Method 1.33
                                                 
33 I conducted a sensitivity analysis where I chose not to remove the size variable.  In that analysis, the size 
variable was insignificant, and the results for the other variables remain the same. 
  The 
results are shown in Table 3U. 
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Table 3U: Cox Regression Estimate of Hazard of Organizational Closure with 
Government, Private, and Other Funding Quartiles 
Independent Variables β  (SE) Hazard Ratio 
Arts, Culture, and Humanities (AR) -0.620 (.095) *** -46.2 
Education (ED) -0.681 (.094) *** -49.4 
Environment and Animals (EN) -0.677 (.100) *** -49.2 
Health (HE) -0.528 (.094) ***  -41.0 
Higher Education (BH) -0.467 (.122) *** -37.3 
Hospitals (EH) -0.351 (.103) *** -29.6 
Human Services (HU) -0.681 (.093) *** -49.4 
International, Foreign Affairs (IN) -0.420 (.114) *** -34.3 
Mutual/Membership Benefit (MU) -0.395 (.137) ** -32.6 
Public, Societal Benefit (PU) -0.577 (.094) *** -43.9 
Religion Related (RE) -0.435 (.096) *** -35.3 
Age -0.001 (.000) * -0.1 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts Q1 -0.431 (.026) *** -35.0 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts Q2 -0.385 (.026) *** -31.9 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts Q3 -0.552 (.028) *** -42.4 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts Q4 -0.680 (.033) *** -49.3 
Private Funding W/ SpEv, Dues Q1 -0.366 (.020) *** -30.6 
Private Funding W/ SpEv, Dues Q2 -0.683 (.022) *** -49.5 
Private Funding W/ SpEv, Dues Q3 -0.998 (.024) *** -63.1 
Private Funding W/ SpEv, Dues Q4 -1.345 (.027) *** -74.0 
Other Revenue (W/out Gov’t, Private Funds) Q1 -1.192 (.056) *** -69.6 
Other Revenue (W/out Gov’t, Private Funds) Q2 -1.463 (.056) *** -76.9 
Other Revenue (W/out Gov’t, Private Funds) Q3 -1.772 (.057) *** -83.0 
Other Revenue (W/out Gov’t, Private Funds) Q4 -2.113 (.058) *** -87.9 
-2 Log likelihood 488007.973 
- 2 LL model chi-square 8504.654 *** 
Number of events (exits)  21208 of 129111 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05  # p < .1 
Note : Standard errors in parentheses. 
The NTEE category for “Unknown” is excluded, so dummy variables for NTEE subsector are 
analyzed in comparison to the Unknown category. 
The category for zero-funded organizations is excluded, so dummy variables for the quartiles of 
government funding are analyzed in comparison to zero-funded organizations. 
 
The government funding quartiles remain significant at the .001 level even with 
the inclusion of the two new revenue sources.  When compared to Table 3C, the 
coefficients here are decreased in absolute terms.  Here, both the private funding and 
other revenue quartiles have coefficients which increase in absolute terms as the quartiles 
increase, a result which indicates that the functional form of the private funding variable 
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is relatively more consistent with the standard log-linear form than the grants and 
contracts variable but leaves questions about the functional form and the 0.000 beta in the 
previous analysis for the other funding variable.  The results here seem inconsistent with 
this earlier value, and I tested slight variations in the data set and methods of handling 
negative values to test the sensitivity of these results.  The analysis lead to similar results, 
and therefore, I am not able to make a firm conclusion regarding the effect of other 
funding on nonprofit survival from these analyses.  However, because the government 
funding beta remains negative, I fail to reject the null hypothesis here. 
 
Method 3  
The next analysis shows the inclusion of the private and other funding sources 
represented by percentage rather than amounts.  This more accurately reflects the work 
done by Hager, Galaskiewicz, and Larson, which used percentages rather than amounts 
or dummy variables for other sources of funding.  Because the three types of funding 
comprise a total of 100 percent (a linear relationship) I must avoid one of them, and I 
choose to represent government funding in absolute terms.  I once again eliminate the 
size variable for easier comparison to the other methods.34  Here, I use the same data set 
that I employed for Hypothesis 1, Method 4, where organizations with negative revenue 
are also filtered because they create negative percentages.35
 
 
                                                 
34 A sensitivity analysis where the size variable remains included reveals an increased beta of -0.016 for the 
government funding variable and a beta of -0.001 for the size variable (both significant at the .001 level).  
The private and other funding variables remain at 0.002 in this analysis. 
35 When I run a sensitivity analysis including the negative-revenue organizations, the value of the three 
main variables if interest decreases.  Percent private has a beta of -.0002 and other revenue has a beta of 
0.000008, and the government revenue variable has a beta of -0.023.  All are significant at the .001 level. 
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Table 3V: Cox Regression Estimate of Hazard of Organizational Closure with Time-
Dependent Government and Time-Dependent Private, Other Funding Percentages 
Independent Variables β  (SE) Hazard Ratio 
Arts, Culture, and Humanities (AR) -1.051 (.094) *** -65.0 
Education (ED) -.954 (.093) *** -61.5 
Environment and Animals (EN) -1.111 (.099) *** -67.1 
Health (HE) -1.011 (.093) *** -63.6 
Higher Education (BH) -1.363 (.120) *** -74.4 
Hospitals (EH) -1.137 (.102) *** -67.9 
Human Services (HU) -1.041 (.092) *** -64.7 
International, Foreign Affairs (IN) -.817 (.113) *** -55.8 
Mutual/Membership Benefit (MU) -.572 (.137) *** -43.5 
Public, Societal Benefit (PU) -.847 (.093) *** -57.1 
Religion Related (RE) -.586 (.095) *** -44.3 
Age -.002 (.000) *** -0.2 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts (in 100000s) TV  -.019 (.001) *** -1.9 
Pct. Private Rev. W/ SpEv Dues TV  .002 (.000) *** 0.2 
Pct. Other Rev.  .002 (.000) *** 0.2 
-2 Log likelihood 502592.812 
- 2 LL model chi-square 977.05 *** 
Number of events (exits) 21531 of 128779 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05  # p < .1 
Note : Standard errors in parentheses. 
The NTEE category for “Unknown” is excluded, so dummy variable for NTEE subsector is in 
comparison to the Unknown category. 
 
Here, the inclusion of variables representing other sources of funding (controlling 
for other sources of funding) does not make the government funding variable 
insignificant.  The beta for government funding is -0.019.  This is a change from the 
results in Hypothesis 1, Model 4, where the variable had a beta of -0.005.  This correlates 
with a 1.9 percent decrease in the hazard of exit for each additional $100,000 in 
government funding.  Here, the private and other funding variables have coefficients of 
0.002, indicating that higher percentages of these funding streams actually increase odds 
of exit.  All of these revenue variables are significant at the .001 level.36
                                                 
36 When I include a government dummy variable instead of the time-varying representation of government 
funding, the beta for this analysis becomes -0.648, which is significant at the .001 level and shows a 
decrease in the hazard of exit by 47.7 percent for those organizations with government funding. 
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This is an interesting result, given that, in Hypothesis 1, the analysis of the 
government funding variable led to a beta of 0.000.  It will be important to examine this 
result in quartile form, because portfolio theory would suggest that some (perhaps 
limited) proportion of funding from any revenue stream is ideal, but a threshold exist 
where too great a reliance on these sources leads to systemic or unsystemic risk which 
would be problematic for survival.  This was effectively demonstrated in the follow-up 
analysis of the government funding percentage quartiles, and I look to the next analysis to 
lead to similar insights regarding this result.  
 
Method 4  
It is possible that the 0.002 coefficients in Model 3 are similar to the coefficients 
in Model 1.  In the fourth Cox regression analysis, I examine the private and other 
funding percentage variables using “quartiles.”  Similar to Method 2, I actually create 
five groupings including a zero-funding group (the omitted category).  The usually-
filtered organizations eliminate all organizations with negative government funding from 
the analysis, and I also filter organizations with negative values for revenue37
                                                 
37 I conducted a sensitivity analysis where these negative-revenue organizations were not filtered.  The 
results were similar to those reported using this more-filtered data set.   
 or for 
private or other funding.  For consistency with other methods employed in this 
hypothesis, I eliminate the size variable.  The results are shown in Table 3W. 
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Table 3W: Cox Regression Estimate of Hazard of Organizational Closure with 
Government Funding Quartiles and Private, Other Funding Percentage Quartiles 
Independent Variables β  (SE) Hazard 
Ratio 
Arts, Culture, and Humanities (AR) -.733 (.095) *** -51.9 
Education (ED) -.796 (.094) *** -54.9 
Environment and Animals (EN) -.813 (.100) *** -55.7 
Health (HE) -.829 (.094) *** -56.3 
Higher Education (BH) -.975 (.122) *** -62.3 
Hospitals (EH) -.943 (.103) *** -61.1 
Human Services (HU) -.869 (.093) *** -58.1 
International, Foreign Affairs (IN) -.678 (.115) *** -49.3 
Mutual/Membership Benefit (MU) -.668 (.139) *** -48.7 
Public, Societal Benefit (PU) -.716 (.094) *** -51.1 
Religion Related (RE) -.559 (.096) *** -42.8 
Age -.002 (.000) *** -0.2 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts Q1 -.506 (.027) *** -39.7 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts Q2 -.635 (.029) *** -47.0 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts Q3 -1.016 (.036) *** -63.8 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts Q4 -1.488 (.045) *** -77.4 
Pct. Private Funding W/ SpEv, Dues Q1 -.572 (.022) *** -43.5 
Pct. Private Funding W/ SpEv, Dues Q2 -.849 (.034) *** -57.2 
Pct. Private Funding W/ SpEv, Dues Q3 -1.016 (.038) *** -63.8 
Pct. Private Funding W/ SpEv, Dues Q4 -1.390 (.047) *** -75.1 
Pct. Other Rev. (W/out Gov’t, Private Funds) Q1 -1.608 (.061) *** -80.0 
Pct. Other Rev. (W/out Gov’t, Private Funds) Q2 -2.053 (.062) *** -87.2 
Pct. Other Rev. (W/out Gov’t, Private Funds) Q3 -2.134 (.065) *** -88.2 
Pct. Other Rev. (W/out Gov’t, Private Funds) Q4 -2.441 (.069) *** -91.3 
-2 Log likelihood 482563.188 
- 2 LL model chi-square 5704.014 *** 
Number of events (exits) 20873 of 125913 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05  # p < .1 
Note : Standard errors in parentheses. 
The NTEE category for “Unknown” is excluded, so dummy variables for NTEE subsector are 
analyzed in comparison to the Unknown category. 
The category for zero-funded organizations is excluded, so dummy variables for the quartiles of 
government funding are analyzed in comparison to zero-funded organizations. 
 
Examining the quartiles for each of the funding streams, one can see that each of 
the coefficients becomes more negative as the value or percentage of that funding steam 
increases.  This is a surprising result, given the positive beta in the previous analysis.  
The results of this analysis neither explain the positive value in the previous method nor 
are they consistent.  To investigate, I conducted a sensitivity analysis on this and the 
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previous model, including slight variations in the data set and methods of handling 
negative values.  The results remained consistent with the primary models.  Therefore, I 
am not able to draw firm conclusions about the role of increasing percentages of private 
and other funding on nonprofit survival.  However, because the government funding 
quartiles maintain negative coefficients, and I once again fail to reject the null hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis H0
The next two analyses employ a more common measure of diversification, the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).  The logic behind including such a test in a paper 
mostly about government grants is that it is possible that presence of government grants 
is partly a proxy for diversification of funding sources.  The following three methods all 
include the HHI variable in some form
3B: After controlling for the overall funding diversification, 
organizations with government funding are equally or less likely to fail than non-
government funding nonprofits.   
38
 
 to see whether the government grants variables 
lose significance when HHI is added to the controls.  If it is a proxy, we would expect 
that the government funding variable would become insignificant. 
Method 1  
The Cox regression allows for inclusion of the HHI in a time-varying form, so I 
run this model first to take advantage of all of the data at my disposal. The results are 
shown in Table 3X. 
                                                 
38 In this analysis, only nonprofits which file the 990, and not the 990EZ, are included, because the data 
collected by the 990EZ is not rich enough to calculate an HHI.  In addition, nonprofits which erroneously 
reported earnings in HHI revenue subcomponents which surpassed their total revenue and, therefore, 
resulted in HHI values above 1, the logical threshold. 
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Table 3X: Cox Regression Estimate of Hazard of Organizational Closure with Time-
Dependent Government Funding and Time-Varying Revenue HHI 
Independent Variables β  (SE) Hazard 
Ratio 
Arts, Culture, and Humanities (AR) -1.385 (.148)*** -75.0 
Education (ED) -1.319 (.147)*** -73.3 
Environment and Animals (EN) -1.451 (.156)*** -76.6 
Health (HE) -1.202 (.146)*** -69.9 
Higher Education (BH) -1.467 (.172)*** -76.9 
Hospitals (EH) -.950 (.154)*** -61.3 
Human Services (HU) -1.346 (.145)*** -74.0 
International, Foreign Affairs (IN) -1.240 (.174)*** -71.1 
Mutual/Membership Benefit (MU) -.557 (.184)** -42.7 
Public, Societal Benefit (PU) -1.090 (.146)*** -66.4 
Religion Related (RE) -.950 (.149)*** -61.3 
Age -.001 (.001)# -0.1 
Size TV (in $100000s) -.001 (.000)*** -0.1 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts TV (in $100000s) -.012 (.001)*** -1.2 
Diversification TV  .576 (.029)*** 78.0 
-2 Log likelihood 268231.341 
- 2 LL model chi-square 912.651 *** 
Number of events (exits) 11971 of 95432 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05  # p < .1 
Note : Standard errors in parentheses. 
The NTEE category for “Unknown” is excluded, so dummy variable for NTEE subsector is in 
comparison to the Unknown category. 
 
Here, the inclusion of the diversification variable does not make the government 
funding variable insignificant (it remains negative and significant at the .001 level).  The 
diversification variable itself is significant at the .001 level and has a 78% increase in the 
hazard of failure for organizations with HHI of 1 (a portfolio relying on one revenue 
stream) when compared to a HHI of near 0 (a highly-diversified portfolio). 
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Method 2  
Next, I analyze the average HHI rather than the time-varying HHI.  The overall 
HHI may be more revealing of the true diversity of nonprofit funding than the HHI 
representing only a particular year.  The results are shown in Table 3Y. 
Table 3Y: Cox Regression Estimate of Hazard of Organizational Closure with Time-
Dependent Government Funding and Average Revenue HHI 
Independent Variables β  (SE) Hazard Ratio 
Arts, Culture, and Humanities (AR) -1.280 (.149)*** -72.2 
Education (ED) -1.290 (.147)*** -72.5 
Environment and Animals (EN) -1.389 (.156)*** -75.1 
Health (HE) -1.176 (.146)*** -69.2 
Higher Education (BH) -1.422 (.172)*** -75.9 
Hospitals (EH) -1.004 (.154)*** -63.4 
Human Services (HU) -1.304 (.145)*** -72.9 
International, Foreign Affairs (IN) -1.269 (.174)*** -71.9 
Mutual/Membership Benefit (MU) -.542 (.184)** -41.9 
Public, Societal Benefit (PU) -1.079 (.146)*** -66.0 
Religion Related (RE) -.961 (.149)*** -61.8 
Age -.001 (.001)# -0.1 
Size TV (in $100000s) -.001 (.000)*** -0.1 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts TV (in $100000s) -.011 (.001)*** -1.1 
Average Diversification 1.099 (.045)*** 200.1 
-2 Log likelihood 268036.228 
- 2 LL model chi-square 1079.750 *** 
Number of events (exits) 11791 of 95432 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05  # p < .1 
Note : Standard errors in parentheses. 
The NTEE category for “Unknown” is excluded, so dummy variable for NTEE subsector is in 
comparison to the Unknown category. 
 
Here, the inclusion of the diversification variable does not make the government 
funding variable insignificant.  Interestingly, the diversification variable itself is 
significant at the .001 level and has a beta of 1.099.  A one-unit increase in the HHI is 
correlated with a 200% increase in the hazard of exit.  After controlling for 
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diversification, the government funding variable retains a negative variable similar to 
previous models (it is significant at the .001 level), and I fail to reject the null hypothesis. 
 
Method 3 
One means of examining the coefficient found in Method 1 and 2 is to examine 
the functional form of the HHI or diversification variable.  Here, I use quartiles to 
analyze the functional form, omitting the smallest quartile.  The results are shown in 
Table 3Z. 
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Table 3Z: Cox Regression Estimate of Hazard of Organizational Closure with Time-
Dependent Government Funding and Average Revenue HHI Quartiles 
Independent Variables β  (SE) Hazard Ratio 
Arts, Culture, and Humanities (AR) -1.308 (.149)*** -73.0 
Education (ED) -1.313 (.147)*** -73.1 
Environment and Animals (EN) -1.415 (.156)*** -75.7 
Health (HE) -1.196 (.146)*** -69.8 
Higher Education (BH) -1.452 (.172)*** -76.6 
Hospitals (EH) -1.018 (.154)*** -63.9 
Human Services (HU) -1.323 (.145)*** -73.4 
International, Foreign Affairs (IN) -1.274 (.174)*** -72.0 
Mutual/Membership Benefit (MU) -.566 (.184)** -43.2 
Public, Societal Benefit (PU) -1.103 (.146)*** -66.8 
Religion Related (RE) -.973 (.149)*** -62.2 
Age -.001 (.001)# -0.1 
Size TV (in $100000s) -.001 (.000)*** -0.1 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts TV (in $100000s) -.011 (.001)*** -1.1 
Average Diversification Q2 .327 (.029)*** 38.6 
Average Diversification Q3 .435 (.029)*** 54.5 
Average Diversification Q4 .650 (.028)*** 91.5 
-2 Log likelihood 268080.053 
- 2 LL model chi-square 1026.972 *** 
Number of events (exits) 11791 of 95432 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05  # p < .1 
Note : Standard errors in parentheses. 
The NTEE category for “Unknown” is excluded, so dummy variable for NTEE subsector is in 
comparison to the Unknown category. 
The omitted quartile includes the lowest 25 percent of HHI variables, and the remaining dummy 
variables are in comparison to the lowest HHI quartile. 
 
Here, the inclusion of the diversification quartiles does not make the government 
funding variable insignificant, which is consistent with the two previous models.  Also 
consistent with the previous model, the three included quartiles have increasing beta 
coefficients, showing that the HHI variable is relatively consistent with the expected 
functional form. 
 
 After controlling for diversification, the government funding variable 
remains negative and significant, and I again fail to reject the null hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 4 
Finally, to combine these ideas, I analyze the variables I found significant in 
earlier tests.  The goal of this analysis is to understand the effects of government funding, 
after controlling for steadiness and diversity.    
 
Hypothesis H0
It is instructive to run this analysis with the government funding variable 
(although I found several representations of this variable to be significant, I will include 
the grants and contracts amount variable in time-varying, lagged form), the HHI quartiles 
(I will use all of the quartiles, even thought only some were shown to be insignificant), 
and the steadiness variables.  Both the government funding and size coefficient of 
variation variables were significant, so I will run two models to use each variable, in turn.  
4: After controlling for government funding steadiness/expenditure 
steadiness and funding diversity, nonprofits receiving government funding are 
equally or less likely to exit as nonprofits not receiving government funding. 
 
Method 1  
For the first Cox regression, I include the steadiness variable for government 
funding.  As before, the diversification variable for HHI quartiles uses the smallest 
quartile as the omitted variable.  The results are shown in Table 3AA. 
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Table 3AA: Cox Regression Estimate of Hazard of Organizational Closure with Time-
Dependent Government Funding, Coefficient-of-Variation-Based Government 
Steadiness, and Average Revenue HHI Quartiles 
Independent Variables β  (SE) Hazard Ratio 
Arts, Culture, and Humanities (AR) -1.267 (.149)*** -71.8 
Education (ED) -1.347 (.147)*** -74.0 
Environment and Animals (EN) -1.356 (.156)*** -74.2 
Health (HE) -1.200 (.146)*** -69.9 
Higher Education (BH) -1.474 (.172)*** -77.1 
Hospitals (EH) -.994 (.154)*** -63.0 
Human Services (HU) -1.302 (.145)*** -72.8 
International, Foreign Affairs (IN) -1.298 (.174)*** -72.7 
Mutual/Membership Benefit (MU) -.648 (.184)*** -47.7 
Public, Societal Benefit (PU) -1.119 (.146)*** -67.3 
Religion Related (RE) -1.048 (.149)*** -64.9 
Age -.001 (.001) -0.1 
Size TV (in $100000s) -.001 (.000)*** -0.1 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts TV (in $100000s) -.011 (.001)*** -1.1 
Steadiness Co. of Var. (Gov’t Grants, Contracts) -.403 (.019)*** -33.1 
Average Diversification Q2 .306 (.029)*** 35.8 
Average Diversification Q3 .425 (.029)*** 53.0 
Average Diversification Q4 .604 (.028)*** 82.9 
-2 Log likelihood 267571.210 
- 2 LL model chi-square 1483.379 *** 
Number of events (exits) 11971 of 95432 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05  # p < .1 
Note : Standard errors in parentheses. 
The NTEE category for “Unknown” is excluded, so dummy variable for NTEE subsector is in 
comparison to the Unknown category. 
The omitted quartile includes the lowest 25 percent of HHI variables, and the remaining dummy 
variables are in comparison to the lowest HHI quartile. 
 
In this analysis, each of the variables was significant at some level except age.  
The coefficient of variation had a significant and negative effect on exit, indicating that a 
1 unit change (an increase of a standard deviation equal to the mean of the variable) leads 
to a 33.1 decrease in the hazard of exit.  Like earlier analyses, the diversification quartiles 
had increasing effects, with the first, or most diversified, quartile (omitted) having the 
lowest hazard of exit, and the fourth, or least diversified, quartile having the greatest 
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hazard of exit.  Especially revealing is that the government funding variable continues to 
have a beta of -0.011 and remains significant at the .001 level.  Each additional $100,000 
of government funding is correlated with a 1.1 percent decrease in the hazard of exit.  
This indicates that government funding is not so entangled with steadiness or diversity 
that the presence of these controls causes a significant change to the government funding 
coefficient.39
 
  Therefore, I fail to reject the null hypothesis. 
Method 2   
For the second Cox regression, I include the steadiness variable for expenditures, 
also known as size.  As before, the diversification variable for HHI quartiles uses the 
smallest quartile as the omitted variable.  The results are shown in Table 3AB. 
                                                 
39 The coefficient of 0.020 is slightly lower in this model than the 0.021 in the original model (Model 1 of 
Hypothesis 1), but given that each has a standard error of .001, it is unlikely that this difference is 
significant. 
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Table 3AB: Cox Regression Estimate of Hazard of Organizational Closure with Time-
Dependent Government Funding, Coefficient-of-Variation-Based Expenditure 
Steadiness, and Average Revenue HHI Quartiles 
Independent Variables β  (SE) Hazard Ratio 
Arts, Culture, and Humanities (AR) -1.314 (.149)*** -73.1 
Education (ED) -1.319 (.147)*** -73.2 
Environment and Animals (EN) -1.436 (.156)*** -76.2 
Health (HE) -1.209 (.146)*** -70.1 
Higher Education (BH) -1.450 (.172)*** -76.5 
Hospitals (EH) -1.047 (.154)*** -64.9 
Human Services (HU) -1.318 (.145)*** -73.2 
International, Foreign Affairs (IN) -1.300 (.174)*** -72.8 
Mutual/Membership Benefit (MU) -.630 (.184)*** -46.7 
Public, Societal Benefit (PU) -1.127 (.146)*** -67.6 
Religion Related (RE) -.978 (.149)*** -62.4 
Age -.001 (.001)# -0.1 
Size TV (in $100000s) -.001 (.000)*** -0.1 
Gov’t Grants and Contracts TV (in $100000s) -.011 (.001)*** -1.1 
Steadiness Co. of Var. (Size) .321 (.035)*** 37.8 
Average Diversification Q2 .312 (.029)*** 36.6 
Average Diversification Q3 .417 (.029)*** 51.8 
Average Diversification Q4 .647 (.028)*** 90.9 
-2 Log likelihood 268003.314 
- 2 LL model chi-square 1027.331 *** 
Number of events (exits) 11791 of 95432 
*** p < .001  ** p < .01  * p < .05  # p < .1 
Note : Standard errors in parentheses. 
The NTEE category for “Unknown” is excluded, so dummy variable for NTEE subsector is in 
comparison to the Unknown category. 
The omitted quartile includes the lowest 25 percent of HHI variables, and the remaining dummy 
variables are in comparison to the lowest HHI quartile. 
 
The pattern of results for Method 2 is similar to the results for Model 1.  Each of 
the variables remains significant.  The coefficient of variation for size’s beta is positive, 
where the expenditures beta was negative, but this is consistent with earlier results.  The 
beta for government funding remains negative, and its value is similar to the value 
without the inclusion of the steadiness and diversity variables.  Once again, based on the 
results from Method 2, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that government-funded 
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organization are equally of less likely to exit than other organizations, after controlling 
for funding steadiness and diversity. 
 
The results outlined in this chapter included over 27 models describing the 
relationship between government funding, funding stability, fund diversification, and 
exit.  The next chapter will discussed and interpret the results, their limitations, and their 
implications for future research and practice. 
Conclusion 
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The results outlined in the previous chapter included over two dozen models 
describing the relationship between government funding, funding stability, funding 
diversity, and exit or failure.  The previous chapter discussed the results of each model.  
Here, I interpret the results as a whole, and I relate the results of my analyses to the 
prevailing literature.  I also examine the practical use of results, the contribution of the 
results to theory, and the limitations of the research.  Finally, I describe recommendations 
for future research. 
 
The benefit of using multiple models to test each hypothesis is that results can be 
shown to be robust for multiple ways of representing each concept.  However, one 
potential problem is deciphering the differences in the various models and ultimately 
accepting or rejecting each hypothesis.  The following section summarizes the results of 
the models chosen to test each hypothesis, emphasizes the significance of certain results, 
and also draws on concepts from the literature to interpret the results. 
Summary/Discussion of Results 
 
Relationship Between Government Funding and Exit 
The first set of analyses tested the null hypothesis that nonprofits receiving 
government funding are equally or less likely than other nonprofits to fail under stable 
funding conditions.  Regardless of the definition of government funding, the method of 
measuring the funding (amount or percent; binary, quartile or continuous variables), the 
filtering of the data set, or the type of calculation used (lagged and non-lagged, Cox 
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regression and binary logistic regression) the results of Hypothesis 1 consistently fail to 
reject the null hypothesis.  The results instead indicate that government funding is 
correlated with a decreased probability of failing in a given time period. 
Although the various tests consistently fail to reject the hypothesis and 
consistently result in negative coefficients for the government funding variables, the 
coefficients of the quartile analyses indicate that the government funding covariate may 
not have the standard loglinear functional form.  Although quartiles are a crude way to 
approximate what might be a more complex functional form, the fact that the hazard ratio 
decreases between quartiles one and two before increasing again does indicate the need 
for further analysis.  Previous researchers have found that misspecified functional forms 
in Cox regression analysis can affect the overall model by decreasing the size of covariate 
effects (for both the misspecified variable and other model variables) and the significance 
of the effects (Therneau and Grambsch 2000). 
A third point of interest in the analysis of government funding and failure is the 
difference between lagged and non-lagged values representing government funds.  
However, the various models tested show inconsistent results.  When examining the 
percentage of government funding variable, the strength of the coefficient for the lagged 
version of the variable (-0.005 with a standard error of 0.000) was much less than the 
non-lagged version of the variable (-0.022 with a standard error of 0.000).  When 
examining the absolute amount of government funding using the dummy and quartile 
methods, the strength of the coefficients for the lagged version of the variables was 
actually greater than the non-lagged versions of the variables.  Therefore, it is difficult to 
generalize conclusions about the effects of lagging variables.  If further work shows that 
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lagged variables have less of an effect on the hazard of exit than non-lagged variables, 
one could hypothesize that most of the impact of funding is felt in the year it is 
received.40
 
  If the impact of funding is largely felt in only the year it is received, then one 
would be forced to conclude that either any positive resource-dependence or legitimacy 
effects are short-lived rather than durable or that negative resource-dependence or 
legitimacy effects harm an organization quickly when the organizations loses its funding.  
Conversely, if future work shows that lagged variables have a greater effect on the hazard 
of exit than non-lagged variables, one could hypothesize that nonprofits require time to 
reap the benefits of government funding or to experience the challenges of funding loss.   
The Steadiness of Funding and Its Relationship with Failure 
The first question I examined related to steadiness was the question of relative 
steadiness among the funding streams.  Previous research had indicated that the relative 
steadiness of government funds was a potential explanation for differences in survival for 
those organizations receiving government support.  Here, I used the null hypothesis that 
government funding was equally stable as other funding types.  To test the hypothesis, I 
first analyzed the mean population standard deviation of funding.  I found that all 
definitions of government funding were steadier than the funding source labeled as 
“other” funding.  The relative steadiness of government funding and private funding 
depended on the definition of government funding I employed.  The grants-only 
definition of government funding had the lowest population mean standard deviation, and 
                                                 
40 There is also the possibility of an endogeneity-related effect.  An endogeneity bias could result if some 
unmeasured variable causes both survival and government funding and a lagged variable may eliminate 
some of this bias unless the effects of the third variable occur in different time periods.  For more 
discussion of endogeneity, see the limitations section later in this chapter.  
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it was steadier than private funding.  My primary, grants-plus-contracts definition of 
government funding and the definition of government funding including 
Medicare/Medicaid were both less steady than private funding.  It is interesting to note 
that, because of the skewness of the variable distributions across the population, the other 
funding variable actually has the lowest median, but the highest mean.  This is likely the 
cause of one non-significant and one less-significant result for comparisons with the other 
funding variable. 
The results of the analysis are quite different when I take the amount of funding 
secured into account.  Analyzing steadiness using the coefficient of variation essentially 
identifies the variation per dollar of funding.  Using this analysis, the other funding 
variable is the most steady (has the lowest coefficient of variation mean) type of revenue. 
Private funding is the next steadiest, and government funding is the least steady type of 
funding.  Among the various definitions of government funding tested, the government 
funding definition including grants, contracts, and Medicare/Medicaid has the lowest 
coefficient of variation; it is the steadiest of the three using this definition.  The 
government grants definition is the least steady of all.  The strength of these mean 
comparisons, compared to the standard deviation mean comparisons, is that the variables 
are more normally distributed, or at least much less skewed.  Therefore, a parametric test 
was possible and all of the results are significant.  When considering the results based on 
the first analysis using standard deviations, I can reject the null hypothesis of mean 
equality in most cases, but am left with a mixed overall impression of the relative 
stability of government, private and other/commercial funding.  However, when 
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considering the second, stronger analysis, the results are not mixed—government funding 
has the greatest variation per dollar of funding.  I firmly reject the null hypothesis.    
Figure 4A: Relative Steadiness of Funding Types, Two Definitions of Steadiness 
Relative 
Steadiness Standard Deviation Co. of Variance 
Most Steady Government Grants Other Rev. 
 Private Rev. w/ SpEv, Dues Private Rev. w/ SpEv, Dues 
 Gov’t Grants, Contracts Gov’t Grants, Contracts, Medic. 
 Gov’t Grants, Contracts, Medic. Gov’t Grants, Contracts 
Least Steady Other Rev. Government Grants 
 
The next two hypotheses analyzed the question of differences in failure between 
those with steady and unsteady funding for a particular stream.  First, I tested two 
versions of steadiness for government grants and contracts, and then I tested steadiness 
variables for overall revenue and expenditures.  Both government funding analyses lead 
to the surprising result that organizations with greater instability have a reduced hazard of 
exit.  Being steadier, using both a standard deviation measure for steadiness and a 
variation per dollar measure, was actually harmful to nonprofit survival, according to the 
results I obtained.  I believe this is due to a misspecified variable.  The measure of 
instability I used doesn’t account for underlying trends, which have been used in previous 
research by Kingma (1993) and others.  Upward growth in funding, which would still 
appear as high within-organization variability, is hardly the problem that one thinks of 
when one things of instable funding.  Upward-trending funding could be correlated with 
decreased hazard of failure, and explain these results.  Analyzing variability in detrended 
data, and possibly also creating a variable that accounts for serial correlation, would help 
with potential misspecification.  If future research finds that this effect persists after 
accounting for trends, one theoretically grounded reason for this result could be that 
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organizations with greater instability experience less structural embeddedness – these 
organizations do not build their administrative systems based on a changing source of 
funding.   
The one type of unsteadiness which was correlated with an increased hazard of 
exit was unsteadiness in expenditures. (The analysis of total revenue was insignificant.)  
The findings indicate that a nonprofit with increased variation per dollar expended has an 
increased probability of failure.  Although the expenditure variable tested here is 
somewhat different than the decreasing program expenditure risk indicator tested by 
Greenlee and Trussel (2000), the link shown here between unsteady expenditures and exit 
does corroborate the assertion that that changes in expenditures (especially decreases) are 
an appropriate measure of ill health and a proxy for actual risk of failure.   
In each of the four analyses associated with Hypothesis 2B, the included, time-
dependent government funding variable remains negative and significant.  Taking into 
account that two of these analyses also controlled for the steadiness of government funds, 
the persistent negative value for the government funding variable indicates that, after 
controlling for steadiness, government funding continues to decrease the odds of failure 
for nonprofit organization.  This would call into question the assertion that the reason 
organizations with government funding are less likely to fail is due to the steadiness of 
this funding stream.  However, because of the likely misspecification identified 
previously, this finding would need to be confirmed using a better-specified steadiness 
variable. 
Finally, I examined only nonprofits with relatively stable funding for all revenue 
categories to determine if, under those conditions, the presence of government funding 
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lead to decreased failure.  The additional restrictions on other funding sources’ stability 
are important because of the likely covariances between the various income streams 
(Kingma 1993; Rose-Ackerman 1981).  In these analyses, I am able to reject the null 
hypothesis regarding government funding for the first time.  In situations where no 
revenue stream fluctuates by more than 10% of its total (coefficient of variation < 0.1 for 
the three revenue categories), the interaction term yields a positive beta, indicating that 
government funding does not lead to an decreased hazard of failure.   
Overall, the results of the analyses dealing with steadiness are far from 
conclusive, due to the likely misspecification of the steadiness variable.  In general, these 
analyses confirm that government funding is correlated with a decreased hazard of failure 
even when controlling for government funding steadiness, and this decrease is mitigated 
only for those organizations that are the “steadiest” across all funding types.  The results 
indicate that government funding must do something positive for an organization other 
than be a steady income stream.  Theories related to government funding as a proxy for 
legitimacy or as an indicator for increased professionalism (and thereby being correlated 
with increased survival) would tend to be supported by these results. 
 
Funding Diversity and Its Relationship with Government Funding and Exit/Failure 
The final set of analyses examined the relationship between diversity of revenue 
sources and nonprofit exit or failure.  While the role and benefits of diversity of funding 
sources is debated, it is generally believed to provide a benefit by reducing risk and 
increasing legitimacy.  The optimal level of diversity is also debated.  Using portfolio 
theory, and understanding the relative stability of funding sources, one would expect that 
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organizations with too great of a concentration on government funding would experience 
negative consequences.  Using portfolio theory, one would also expect that that some 
level of government funding, although it is the least stable of the funding sources I 
examined, would be included in an optimally-diversified portfolio.  It would not be 
unreasonable to believe that the positive effects on survival that I found for government 
funding in Hypothesis 1 are merely a proxy for funding mix diversification.  Here, I 
attempt to interpret the degree to which my results do or do not support these ideas.  
The calculations from the Hypothesis 1 analysis for government funding 
percentage are a useful place to start this discussion.  In Hypothesis 1, I analyzed the 
effects of increasing percentages of government funding using both a continuous variable 
and quartiles (to examine functional form).  I found that, although the continuous variable 
had a beta of -0.005, indicating that increasing government funding percentages had a 
negative effect on the hazard rate, this calculation was commingling the effects of having 
government funding with the effects of increasing percentage of government funding.  
Using the quartiles analysis (and a subsequent analysis of the continuous variable using 
only government-funded organizations) I found that the reduced hazard of failure benefit 
was highest for organizations in the lowest quartile of government funding percentages.  
In other words, those organizations that were the most reliant on government experienced 
the smallest decrease in the hazard of failure.  From these results, it is evident that there is 
a benefit to having government funding as part of a balanced portfolio, but the benefit 
decreases with the larger percentages of government funding.  This is consistent with the 
prevailing wisdom regarding choosing a portfolio which balances funding sources to 
minimize risk (such as the risk of unstable government funding streams).   
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The first method of examining diversification I used in Hypothesis 3 was adding 
private and other funding variables to the analysis.  From this, one can determine if the 
patterns revealed related to government revenue hold true for donated and other revenue.  
Like the government funding stream, a marginal increase in the amount of private and 
other revenue is correlated with a decreased hazard of exit.  Unlike the government 
funding stream, the quartiles progress in a way that more closely reflect the log-linear 
functional form.  In addition, the effects of private and other funding are inconclusive; 
certain models showed increased hazard of failure with increases in these funding 
streams, and other models showed decreased hazards of failure.  Given that the analysis 
for government funding showed a large degree of variation based on percentage funding 
quartile, the relative ambiguity of the effects of non-diversified funding streams 
concentrated on private funding or other funding is notable. 
I next tested the null hypothesis that, after controlling for funding type 
diversification, measured by HHI, government-funded nonprofits are equally or more 
likely to fail.  If government funding is simply a proxy for diversification of funding, then 
the addition of a diversification variable would cause the government funding variable to 
lose significance.  The three analyses I conducted using this data set consistently showed 
that organizations with less diversification (higher HHI scores) had increased hazards of 
failure when compared with organizations with more diversification (lower HHI scores).  
This would lend support to the idea that too little diversification carries increased risks, 
including, potentially, risks of structural embeddedness.  Based on the these analyses, I 
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have shown that the HHI model of diversification41
Because the government funding variable retains its significance in each of the 
models tested, I have indicated that the effects of government funding are separate from 
the effects from diversity.  This work demonstrates that, when diversity of an 
organization’s portfolio is held constant, having government funds is not correlated with 
an increased hazard of failure, but instead would tend to indicate a decreased hazard of 
failure.  Therefore, I reject the null hypothesis and demonstrate that government funding 
variable does not act merely as a proxy for diversification. 
, which uses all reported streams 
rather than three funding categories, has a significant impact on nonprofit survival.  This 
would support and expand the findings by Hager (2001) which showed similar links 
between diversification and survival specifically for arts organizations.  It also is in line 
with Chang and Tuckman’s (1994) finding that diversification is usually correlated with 
greater financial strength, and would support the conclusion that this strength is 
correlated with survival.   
 
The Combined Model 
The final hypothesis can be used to understand the relationship between 
government funding and exit when controlling for both steadiness of the government 
funding stream and overall diversification of the organization’s funding mix (HHI value).  
In this case, the government funding variable maintains its significant negative beta, 
indicating that each additional $100,000 of government funding is correlated with a 2 
percent decrease in the hazard of exit.  This indicates that that the benefits of government 
                                                 
41 It should be noted that, when examining HHI, constant diversity does not imply identical funding mixes, 
just equivalent HHI values.  The model does not allow for conclusions about particular streams, but does 
allow for general tests regarding diversity. 
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funding are not explained merely by the steadiness or diversification role of the funding 
stream.  
This work finds that, in most cases, one cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
government funding decreases the risk of failure.  Indeed, the results support the idea that 
government funding decreases likelihood of failure.  The use of lagged variables, other 
calculation types, the analyses controlling for diversity of funding, and the analyses 
controlling for steadiness of the government funding itself do not affect this relationship 
(although steadiness of all sources can have an effect).  Instead, the consistent effect of 
government funding strengthens the case for a causal relationship and eliminates possible 
alternative explanations for the correlation.   
Furthermore, this work provides substantial evidence that, for a broader sample of 
organizations, the conclusions of the Hager, Galaskiewicz, and Larson (2004) study do 
not hold.  There are several unique characteristics of the data set used by Hager, 
Galaskiewicz, and Larson (2004) which likely explain this difference.  Hager et al. was 
conducted with a very small sample of organizations in one geographic location, which 
necessarily lead to a cohort of organizations with the same local government and state 
government.  In addition, that research was based on a different, longer time period than 
the research here.  Finally, that work used a dataset which included all organizations 
granted nonprofit status by the federal government, including many smaller nonprofits 
that are not included in the data set examined here. 
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The calculations described here were done using a data set spanning 1998 to 
2003.  Concepts like steadiness are necessarily dependent on the time frame examined.  
Some practitioners and researchers contend that 1998 to 2003 is a time period where 
governments did not face difficult budget decisions and, therefore, the funding was more 
stable.  The six years from 1998 to 2003 included a change in presidential administration 
and many changes in local and state governments.  Such changes always entail financial 
decisions and changes, and therefore, the time period should not have limited the analysis 
in this way. The time examined here also included a period of economic recession (as 
defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research) encompassing March to 
November 2001.  However, this recession was relatively mild, and the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis’s revised estimates do not reveal the traditional “two consecutive 
quarters of falling GDP” benchmark, instead indicating a 0.1% growth in GDP during the 
first three quarters of 2001.  Therefore, the analysis may be limited by the relative 
economic stability of this period, which is different from the economic conditions being 
experienced by many nonprofits in 2008, 2009, and 2010. 
Limitations 
Other limitations stem from the nonprofit organizations in the data set.  The 
results discussed here cannot be assumed to apply to small nonprofits or religious 
nonprofits.  There were very few organizations with gross receipts of less than $25,000 
included in the data set (and I excluded all those that were initially included from all but 
my most inclusive alternative data set), and nearly all of the previous research showed a 
significant positive relationship between revenue under $25,000 and failure.  This result, 
like other previous research, may or may not hold with a larger sample of small 
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nonprofits, but it certainly indicates that these organizations may have different 
characteristics than the other organizations in the data set.   
In addition to limitations posed by the exclusion of nonprofits with under $25,000 
in gross receipts, nonprofits with less than $100,000 in gross receipts complete a Form 
990EZ, which includes only high-level information about sources of funds.42
If measurement error is uncorrelated with the other covariates, one would 
commonly expect that the related coefficient would be biased toward zero.
  As 
mentioned in the methodology section, among those filing the Form 990EZ, there may be 
a small number of nonprofits who receive small grants (less than the $100,000 Form 990 
filing threshold) that are coded as $0 due to way information is reported on the Form 
990EZ.  If this were true, there would be a small number of organizations with a 
measurement error in the government funding variable.   
43
                                                 
42 Unfortunately, under the new IRS Form 990 guidelines, the filing threshold for the regular IRS Form 990 
has been raised to $500,000.  Therefore an increased number of nonprofits will be eligible to file the 
990EZ, a less-informative form. 
  Therefore 
one would observe that organizations receiving the least government funding have lower, 
and potentially insignificant, changes in hazard rate.  However, as one can see in 
Hypothesis 1, Model 3, organizations in the smallest quartile of government-funded 
organizations are less likely to fail than organizations in the second quartile which 
receive more government funding.  Furthermore, when all Form 990EZ filers are 
excluded from the data set (the most likely correction available without additional data 
from other databases or original surveys) in Model 1 footnotes, the coefficient of the 
government funding variable decreases.  This demonstrates that the strength of the 
government funding effect is stronger for Form 990EZ filers than for the general 
43 It is possible that the measurement error may be correlated with other covariates in some way, therefore 
complicating the assumptions about the direction of bias.   
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population of Form 990 filers.  Since the models here show a significant effect for the 
organizations with a small amount of government funding, and this may be biased toward 
zero, then correcting for the measurement error in some way would likely not make 
qualitative changes to the conclusions presented here.   
The well-established issues with nonprofit reporting on the IRS Form 990 are also 
limitations in this research.  Estimating government support from the Form 990 is still 
somewhat hindered by insufficiently detailed information.  Nonprofits are asked to 
specifically report “fees and contracts from government agencies” and this would 
typically include payments from redeeming consumer-side vouchers; however, this 
revenue may be mistakenly included by nonprofits only as general program fee income.  
An important area where filing organizations have latitude is in the booking of multi-year 
grants, which may lead to a spike in one year of government revenue, although the 
funding is actually being spent over time.  Although the accuracy of these forms has 
increased in recent years due to the persuasiveness of groups like the Urban Institute, 
there is still evidence that amateurism among nonprofits or vagueness in IRS instructions 
results in a failure to report accurately (Urban Institute 2006; NCCS 2006).44
Furthermore, because of limited definitive research on the complex interactions 
between factors within nonprofit organizations (and the limited data set available to me), 
this work suffers from possible endogeneity bias.  Non-measured or non-included 
variables would influence the error term, and the resultant error term may be correlated 
with one of the independent variables in the model, wrongly assigning some of the effects 
   
                                                 
44 Regardless of its improved instructions and additional information regarding governance, employees, 
and assets, the new IRS Form 990 may actually provide less precise revenue information than the previous 
form.  The new form requires that government grants be reported separately, but it only requires the five 
largest sources of program service revenue be reported and does not seem to require an explicit breakout of 
Medicare/Medicaid or government contracts. 
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of the non-included variable to the included independent variable.  Such endogenous 
variable could be anything from the metropolitan region the nonprofit inhabits to the 
education level of the executive director.  Another complex interaction which I do not 
include an explicit correction for is covariances between funding types.45
Finally, the organizations described as failing in this paper may or may not have 
truly failed.  They may have slipped below the filing threshold, merged, or succeeded in 
achieving their objectives.  Of these three reasons, mergers are most like failure, because 
few nonprofit leaders choose to go through the difficult process of merging unless they 
are in tenuous financial circumstance.  Slipping below $25,000 in gross receipts is also 
dangerous for most nonprofits because a limited funding stream limits many 
organizations’ abilities to achieve their missions.  However, one cannot assume that all 
organizations that continue are actually successful in achieving their mission or 
furthering their stated charitable purpose—non-failure is certainly distinct from what 
most nonprofits would define as success.
  Kingma (1993) 
and other previous researchers have suggested that these are relevant when considering 
optimal funding mixes. 
 46
 
  The findings should be interpreted to show, 
not that continuing organizations are successful, but that exiting organizations failed to 
remain a self-determining, financially significant, operating organizations. 
                                                 
45 As shown in Chapter 2, I did test for correlations between the primary variables, and I did remove the 
Size variable when testing the Other Funding variable (these two had a high correlation). 
46 There is an underlying assumption in this work that failure or closure is an undesirable state for 
nonprofits.  There is another viable perspective that nonprofit failure is healthy for the sector, as it allows 
resources to flow to stronger organizations with, presumably, better ability to achieve societal impact. 
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Practical Implications 
Implications and Recommendations 
The analyses reported here have practical implications for nonprofit managers as 
well as policymakers.  Nonprofit boards and managers are conscious of the risks involved 
in all types of funding, including government funding.  I have shown that the risk of 
closure, which most managers would consider a negative effect, found by Hager, 
Galaskiewicz, and Larson do not hold for a larger, more diverse sample.  Therefore, 
managers and Board members should not be hesitant to accept this type of funding.  
However, once they have accepted government funds, they must realize that more 
funding does not necessarily equate to more protection.  The best strategy appears to be 
accepting government funds, but keeping the amount limited and keeping the ratio of 
government funding to other types of funding low.47
Second, managers should be conscious that government funding can be unstable.  
On a dollar-for-dollar basis, government funding is actually the most unsteady of the 
funding streams I examined.  Managers would be wise to avoid building core programs 
around government funding.  Although I have shown here that simple instability, such as 
government funding instability, does not lead to a greater risk of failure, further research 
is needed in this area.  At the very least, managers should be conscious of the funding 
trends their organization is experiencing and avoid instability within that trend.  
  Policy-makers could incentivize 
funding diversification, and often do, by requiring matching funds or issuing grants as 
“challenges” to organizations. 
                                                 
47 The knowledge that lower percentages of government funding are correlated with increased survival 
when compared to high levels of government funding may also provide an additional rationale to educate 
managers who are operating in Brooks’ (2000b) hypothetical “short-term subsidy trap,” the label he created 
for organizations which are earning sub-optimal total revenues by operating at high levels of government 
funding that may crowd-out private donations.  
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Although my work shows that funding instability may be uncorrelated with 
failure, it also shows that instability of expenditures are not.  Managers should use 
caution when expanding programs.  They should also be aware of the potential instability 
of the funding source for this expanding program.  Policymakers should also be aware of 
the possible negative drawback to expenditure instability and, therefore, fund existing 
programs or incremental growth rather than large grants that may require an organization 
to grow dramatically.  This would tend to call into question funding programs which are 
essentially government-funded, ground-up program creation. 
Finally, organizational leaders should take note of the issues surrounding funding 
mix.  As I showed in Hypothesis 3, non-diversified organizations had the highest hazard 
of failure, while diversified organizations had the lowest hazard of failure.  Obtaining a 
variety of funding streams, within the limits of the skills of the organization to manage 
and maintain those funding streams, is a strategy which seems to decrease the odds of 
organizational exit.  This finding supports previous comments about the danger of 
government-funded program creation and large government grants, because these types 
of funding strategies would tend to be correlated with less diversified funding patterns, 
and, therefore, would be at greater risk. 
 
Recommendations for Further Research 
As a result of the data set chosen in this research, government funding was treated 
as one source with three definitions.  However, in reality, government funding can be 
further divided in funding from the federal government, state government, and other 
government sources.  It may also be divided into competitive funding, market-side 
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funding, and earmarked funding.  There is reason to believe that each of these funding 
types might have different effects on nonprofit failure and stability of each stream may 
vary.  In addition, organizations likely require different types of skills to obtain each of 
these types of funding.  When federal funding is competitive and distributed through a 
complex RFP process, it requires a sophisticated finance and grantwriting function.  
Local and state funding is more often earmarked, and earmarked funding is usually 
determined by the strength of an organization’s relationships with elected officials or the 
political power of its stakeholders.  Finally, the financial benefit of market-side funding 
may be reliant on marketing skills or determined by the operational margins per client a 
nonprofit is able to achieve.  Finally, different types of funding may confer different 
reputations and different legitimacy benefits or drawbacks.  Researchers might begin to 
untangle these concepts by separating the sources of government funding.   
Past researchers have shown that the philanthropic culture of a metropolitan area 
is significantly correlated with failure (Twombly 2003).  This variable could be included 
for those nonprofits in cities where previous research has defined a philanthropic culture.  
The location of the nonprofit is defined by the Digitized Data database, although there are 
issues with nonprofits operating in cities other than where they may be headquartered or 
incorporated.  Although most nonprofits are unlikely to change their location based on 
these findings, nonprofit leaders can be more aware of the strengths and weaknesses of 
their cities’ philanthropic culture and adjust their strategies accordingly. 
As reviewed in the summary of results from Hypothesis 1, several of the control 
variables as well as the variables representing amount and percentage of funding did not 
have a constant effect over all values of the variable.  A more complex model might be 
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developed in future research to more accurately represent the true shape of these 
variables in the Cox regression.   
Another concept which might be represented with more complexity is that of 
funding diversification.  Because of the limitations of the Digitized Data dataset, there is 
no way to determine if a funding category is made up of one large source/donor or many 
small sources/donors.  One would need to add a second data set related to a charity’s 
demonstration of meeting its public support test, which is not included with the Digitized 
Data at this time (although NCCS’ Business Master File does contain information stating 
if an organization is required to meet the public support test).48
The idea of instability is also worthy of further study.  As outlined earlier, the 
results here indicated higher instability is linked to lower exit.  This may be because the 
measure used was not sufficiently nuanced to capture the issues of instability.  It is 
unclear if organizations are experiencing upward trends or random periods of high and 
low funding.  Kingma states that only unexpected instability creates risk and that, for the 
total measure of stability, covariances must also be considered (1993).  Information on 
expected instability, perhaps including a model of expected growth based on past 
  With additional data 
from interviews or surveys, this information could be used to calculate a measure of 
funding diversification using techniques from the financial services field.  Practitioners 
could use these findings to determine how to use their fund development time and 
energy. 
                                                 
48 Under the new filing requirements, most organizations will be required to disclose their most significant 
contributors in Schedule B.  This will allow researchers to approximate the diversity of the contributions 
line item, although additional information will still be required to determine the diversity of other revenue 
streams. 
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changes, such as Kingma (1993) or Carroll and Stater (2008) do, and funding stream 
covariances would be useful additions to future work.   
There is also an opportunity to use the data and techniques employed here to test 
the Tuckman and Chang (1991) indicators of financial vulnerability.  The indicators 
could be tested to show the strength of correlation between vulnerability and exit, similar 
to the Greenlee and Trussel (2000) tests related to reduced program expenditures or 
assets the Carroll and Stater (2008) tests related to revenue volatility.  The indicators 
could also be extended by incorporating the source of revenues (for instance, determining 
if vulnerability based on days of cash-on-hand or net margin is different for various types 
of funding).   
Finally, if the NCCS were to expand the time period covered by the Digitized 
Data dataset and include information from the new 990N form, there would be increased 
assurance that nonprofits exiting the data set actually cease to exist.49
                                                 
49 The new requirements dictate that nonprofits of all sizes (certain religious nonprofits and select 
governmental/political organizations continue to be exempt) return one of the series of forms each year, 
increasing the likelihood that nonprofits disappearing from the data set have failed. 
  In addition, if the 
NCCS were to expand the time period covered by the Digitized Data dataset, the analysis 
could be expanded to account for greater variations in economic and political conditions.  
In this case, the model could include control variables such as a scalar variable 
representing the economic environment (i.e. growth in GDP, stock market performance, 
etc.) and dummy variables representing political shifts, such as change in presidents or 
governors (although this would be affected by the geographic expectations discussed 
earlier).  By including these factors, researchers could unpack some of the reasons why 
government funding can be unstable and potentially recommend changes to policy based 
on these findings. 
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A review of the literature shows that the reasons for nonprofit failures are not 
well-understood.  Even in practice, many organizations cannot pinpoint the root causes of 
their failure.  Previous research, conducted with a very small sample of organizations that 
were affected by the same local government and state government decisions, found that 
government funding led to a 155 percent greater hazard of failure.  When examining a 
much larger and more geographically dispersed sample of nonprofits, this research has 
failed to confirm those findings.  Instead, the findings show that government funding, 
regardless of the definition or how it is measured, decreases the hazard of failure. 
Conclusion 
In addition to the findings related to government funding, this research also lends 
valuable insight into steadiness.  I find that government funding is more unstable when 
measured on a variation per dollar basis.  Although I call for further specification of the 
steadiness variable in future research, I tentatively find that instability does not 
significantly increase the hazard rate.  In the area of diversification, I find ample evidence 
that increasing diversification, measured by HHI, is beneficial to nonprofit survival. 
With this knowledge, researchers must begin to untangle what is important about 
government funding that protects organizations from failure and uncover the reasons why 
some organizations still fail after having obtained government funding.  Until that point, 
organizations need not avoid government funding because it may be correlated with 
failure.  However, they do need to be aware of its instability and the issues surrounding a 
funding mix with a higher proportion of government funding, and plan accordingly.
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